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The liability of the owners and the liability of the ship dommence at the same moment, and it will attach on delivery of the
goods to the owner's servants alongside of the vessel: British
Col rTbia Saw Mill Go. v. Nettleship, L. R., 3 C. P. 499; The
Edwin, supra; 2 Pars. on Ad. and Ship. 252; Angell on
Carriers 129, 148. Although of course neither owner nor ship
will be liable if the delivery be made without any previous contract to a servant who has no authority, either apparent or real,
to receive them: Trowbridge v. Chapin, 23 Conn. 595; The
Keokul, 9 Wall. 517.
TnEODORE M. ETTING.
Philadelphia.
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The general rule that a contract, valid by the law of the place vwhere it is made,
is valid everywhere, includes the contract of marriage.
To this rule, as regards marriage, there are exceptions, first, of incest or
polygamy coming within the prohibitions of natural law ; and second, of prohibition

by positive law.
While laws may have an extra-territorial effect, so far as to affect a citizefi subject
to them for acts done outside the state, yet such effect is exceptional, and a statute
imposing a personal disqualification will not be construed to extend to acts done
beyond the state, unless it contains express words to that effect.
The provision of the statute prohibiting a respondent divorced for adultery from
marrying again is a penalty and has no extra-territorial effect.
A man divorced by the courts of New York for adultery, and therefore prohibited
from marrying again, went to Connecticut with the intent to evade that prohibition,
married and immediately returned to New York. Held, that the marriage was
valid.

THIs was an action to determine the rights of the parties under
the will of Elias Van Voorhis.
Barker Van Voorhis, a son of testator, was divorced from his
wife in 1872, by a decree of the Supreme Court of New York, by

which ,he was prohibited from marrying again.
VoL. XXX.-2

In 1874, being
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still domiciled in New York, he and Ida Shraeder, also a citizen
of New York, went to Connecticut and were duly married under
the laws of that state. On the same day the couple returned to
New York and remained domiciled there till the death of Barker
in 1880. It was found as a fact by the court below, that they had
gone to Connecticut fbr the purpose of evading the New York law.
The plaintiff in error, Rose Van Voorhis, was the child of this
marriage, .and the question was whether she was a legitimate child
of Barker, and therefore entitled to share under the will of her'
grandfather, the testator.
D. i1. Porter, for appellant.
C. W. Stevens and R. Busteed, Jr., contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
[After stating the facts.]. The question involves
the civil status acquired by Barker Van Voorhis and Ida by the
marriage in Connecticut. First. It is a general rule of law, that
a contract entered into in another state or country, if valid according to the law of that place, is valid everywhere (The ZKing of
Spain v. Mach ado, 4 Russ. 225; Potter v. Brown, 5 East. 130;
Story Conflict of Laws, sect. 242) ; and this, says KENT, 2 Com.
454, is jure gentium, and by tacit assent; and Lord BROUGHAM,
in Tfarrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & Fin. 529, 530, declares that
the courts of the country where the question arises resort to the
law of the country where the contract was made, not ex comitate
but ea debito justitic ; and, according to the case in hand, the
rule recognises as valid a marriage considered valid in the place
where celebrated: Story Conflict of Laws, sects. 69, 79; Connelly
v. Connelly, 14 Jur. 437. "We all know," says the court in that
case, " that in questions of marriage contract, the lex loci contractus is that which is to determine the status of the parties," and
also declares that this, by consent of all nations, isjus gentium.
In Dalr.ymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. 54, it was held that a marriage good in Scotland, though otherwise by the laws of England,
is valid in that country; and this was put upon the ground that
the rights of the parties must be tried by reference to the law of
the country where they originated. In Scrimslire v. 9crimshire,
2 Hagg. 395, the same principle is stated in different words. The
DAN rORTH, J.
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court says: "All parties contracting gain a forum in the place
where the contract is entered into :" Warrender v. Warrender,
supra; Lacon,v. HJqgins, Don. & R. N. P. 0. 38 ; Butler v. Freemain, Amb. 303. Not only is this the result of English decisions,
but is believed to state the principle upon which the courts of many
of our sister states have acted: Greenwood v. Cuartis, 6 Mass.
358; Iledway v. Needlham, 16 Id. 157; -Parton v. Hervey, 1
Gray 119; Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433; Dickson v..Dickson,
1 Yerg. 110; Stevenson v. Gray, 17 B. Mon. 193.; Jfornshill v.
MIurray, 1 Bland Ch. 479, and by which our own with few exceptions, have been governed. In Decouche v, Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch.
210, Chancellor KENT says: "There is no doubt of the general
principle that the rights dependent upon nuptial contracts are to
be determined by the lex loci." In Cropsey v. Ogden, 11 N. Y.
228, JohNsoN, J, says: "By the universal practice of civilized
nations, the permission or prohibition of particular marriages of
right belongs to the country where the marriage is to be celebrated."
The court had before it the case of one who, having a former
wife living, from whom he then had been divorced for adultery by
him committed, married a second time in this state. His last marriage was held to be void under our statute prohibiting a second
or other subsequent marriage by any person during the lifetime of
any former husband or wife of such person. Here the former
marriage, his'adultery and the existence of his first wife, established
the condition or quality of the man. They were facts in his history, and brought him within the terms of our law. The general
rule above stated was applied. The lex loci governed. But the
court said it was not hecessary for them to consider what would
have been the effect of a marriage celebrated out of this state. Its
attention was, however, directly brought to the statute relating to
marriages, and the circumstances under which the remarks above
quoted, and others seeming to discriminate between a marriage in
this state and out of it, were made, render them the more significant. In Haviland v. Halstead, 34 N. Y. 643, a person divorced
for the same offence in this state, promised in New Jersey to marry
the plaintiff. He married another, and an action for the breach
of this promise was brought here, and failed. The parties resided
in this state and contemplated the performance of the contract
here. The court carefully distinguish the case so presented from
one where a marriage had taken place in a foreign state. They
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assume that the latter would be treated as valid, although the
parties had gone there with intent to evade the laws of this state,
and citing Aiedway v. Needham, supra, say the doctrine "in favor
of marriage so contracted is founded on principles of policy, to
prevent the great inconvenience and cruelty of bastardizing the
issue of such marriages, and to 'avoid the public mischief which
would result from the loose state in which people so situated would
live." Indeed, the general doctrine is so well settled by the'
decisions of all courts and the reiteration of text-writers, -as to
become a maxim in the law, that one rule in these cases should be
followed by all countries; that is, the law of the country where
the contract is made: Story, supra, 84; 2 Kent Com. 91, 92.
There are, no doubt, exceptions to this rule. Cases, first, of incest
or polygamy coming within the prohibitions of natural law: Wightman v. Wigltman, 4 Johns. Oh. 343; JHutchins v. .firnell, 31
Mich. 133; Story, supra, sect. 113, 7th ed; second, of prohibition by positive law. It is contended by learned counsel for the
respondent, that the judgment may be upheld upon the ground
that-the marriage is one of the latter class. The assertion, however, is left unsupported by argument or the citation of authorities. Its truth is not so self-evident as to dispense with either,
and the omission, coupled with our own examination, leaves us to
think that the courts have not yet spoken with a controlling voice
in its favor. It is to be maintained, if at all, upon the prohibition
in the judgment of div;orce already referred to, and the provisions
of the statute which made the judgment proper: Graves v. Graves,
2 Paige 62. The question is not one of ethics or morality but
the extent of the authority of the statute as a rule of conduct.
As a direct inquiry, it is here for the first time. There are dicta
and expressions having relation to it in Cropsey v. Ogden, and
H7aviland v. .Ealstead,supra, tending to confine the effect of the
statutory prohibition and declaration of invalidity to second marriages within this state ; but in neither case was the precise question
before the court for judgment. In other courts of this state it has
met with differing answers. In the Supreme Court, First Department (Marshall v. Harshal,2 Hun. 238, by a divided court, and
T.orpe v.. Thiorpe, Superior Court of the City of INew York, following it), a marriage under similar circumstances was held void.
The judgment now before us went upon the' principle of stare
decisis, the court below also following Marshali v. 111arshall,
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stpra. Ker'ison v. Kerrion,Special Term, Fourth Department,
8 Abb. N. 0. 444, and Matter of Webb, 1 Tucker 372 (Sur. Ct.),
are to the contrary. To the latter class may be added Ponsford
v. Johnson, before NELSON and BETTS, JJ., 2 Blatch. 51. These
decisions are irreconcilable, and any determination reached by us
must overrule one class or the other. We are therefore at liberty
to treat the subject as res integra, unaffected by any paramount
authority, although greatly assisted by the reasoning of the learned
judges who have taken part in those judgments.
The statutory provisions relied upon by the respondent are
found in part 2, ch. 8 of the Revised Statutes, entitled "Of the
domestic relations," and especially in those articles which treat
"of husband and wife," tit. 1, arts. 1-5, vol. 3, p. 148. The
statute does not define marriage, or introduce a new formula for
the relation, but treats it as existing, and declares it shall continue "in this state" a civil contract. See. 1, ch. 8, tit. 1, art. 1,
part 2, adopts the principles of the common law, which renders
invalid marriages between persons connected by certain lines of
consanguinity (see. 8, Id.), or who; for want of age or understanding, are incapable of consent, or who, if capable, have been induced to give it by fraud or force: Sec. 4, Id. It then declares
that no second marriage shall be contracted by any person during
the lifetime of any former husband or wife of such person, unless
the marriage with such "former husband or wife shall have been
dissolved for some cause other than the adultery of such person;
and that every marriage contracted contrary to this provision
shall be absolutely void :" See. 5, Id. These circumstances are
re-stated as grounds of divorce, and it is enacted that " whenever
a marriage shall be dissolved pursuant to the provisions of this
article, the complainant may marry again during the lifetime of
the defendant; but no defendant convicted of adultery shall marry
again until the death of the complainant :" See. 49, Id., art. 3.
As originally enacted, the same statute (tit. 1, supra, see. 2) not
only made the consent of parties essential, but limited the class
to those "capable in law of contracting," and by its definition
excluded males under seventeen and females under fourteen years
of age. Although this provision has been repealed, it throws some
light upon the legislative intent in devising the system of laws
concerning husband and wife. Conditions were annexed, not only
to the duration, but the creation of this relation, and the frequency
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with which it might be formed. Certain persons were declared
capable, others incapable of forming it, and still others must submit to its dissolution. In one instance, as in the case before us,
it cannot be contracted with another while the first co-contractor
is living. It is obvious that this last condition is in the nature
of a penalty: Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 101 ; Comm. v. Lane, 113
MAass. 471. It forms no part of the relief sought by the injured
party, has no tendency toward compensation, nor is it imposed
to that end. It is restraint or punishment: West Cambridge v.
Lexington, 1 Pick. 506-508; Clark v. Clark, 8 Cush. 386. The
fact of adultery is, in the language of the statute, an "offence,"
the person committing it a "guilty person," and when established
by judgment he is said to be "convicted;" he is, in consequence
of it, deprived of a natural right or privilege which others enjoy.
loreover, for violating this statutory provision, he is at least rendered liable to fine and imprisonment as for a misdemeanor (2
R. S., part 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, p. 696, sees. 39, 40), if not for felony,
under the provisions of article 2 of the same statute: 2 R. S., p.
687, vol. 2. The opinion of WALWORTH, Chancellor, went to that
extent in Graves v. Graves, 2 Paige 62; and, although People v.
lovey, .5 Barb. 121, is to the contrary, the measure of the offence
is not now important, and the last case holds to the misdemeanor.
To that extent the law is plain. The real question is whether
such a statute furnishes an exception to the maxim "Leges extra
territorium non oblqant." It is not necessary to assert that the
power of the legislature is so limited that no law passed by it
would accompany a citizen into other countries, and there control
or modify the legal effect of his actions. Nor need we deny that
it might be so framed as to affect his' person, and subject him in
this state to punishment for its violation elsewhere, upon his
return to the jurisdiction of our courts. On the contrary it is to
be regarded as settled law that as all persons within its borders,
whether citizens or aliens, are liable to be punished for any offence
committed in this state against its laws, its citizens may also be
punished for acts committed beyond its borders, where there is a
special provision of law declaring the act to be an offence, although
committed out of the state: Maxwell on Sthtutes 119, 128: Cope
v. Doherty, 2 De G. & J. 624; 1 Burge Col. & For. Laws 196.
So, also, may an act committed out of the state be made to affect
an individual, whether citizen or foreigner, when he comes within
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its borders and does some other act of which our laws take notice.
Nor are examples of legislation effecting these results wanting.
The statute defining acts which constitute treason (tit. 1, part 4,
ch. 1, p. 928 ; 3 R. S., sec. 2) illustrates the first. It subjects the
offender to punishment, whether the act prohibited is done " in
this state or elsewhere." That againsi duelling is an example of
the second. It makes one who, by previous engagement, fights a
duel without the jurisdiction of this state, and in so doing inflicts
a wound upon any person, "whereof he shall die within this
state," and every second engaged in such duel, guilty of murder
within this state. And still more in point, as illustrating its manner of expression, where the legislature intends to take cognisance
of an act committed outside the limits of the state, or to impress
upon the status of its citizens a condition of liability for such an act,
are the revisions of the statute treating of offences against "the public peace and public morals :" tit. 5,part 4, ch. 1, act. 1, vol. 2,
R. S. After providing punishments for fighting duels, sending
challenges, &c., in the most general terms, excluding no one from
its condemnation, but within the general maxim above quoted,
having no extra-territorial force, comes a provision which, by its
special language, attaches to the citizen, goes with him as he
crosses the line of this state, and binds him with an obligation
in what place soever he is. "If," it says (see.. 5, Id.), "any
inhabitant of this state shall leave the same for the purpose of
eluding the operation " of these provisions, and " shall give or
receive any such challenge"

* * * without this state, he shall

be deemed guilty and subject to the like punishment as if the
offence had been committed within this state. And we shall see
later a provision similar to this, now forming part of the law
Another
relating to marriages in the state of Massachusetts.
instance well shows by contrast the necessity of a declaration
that the arm of the law shall be so extended. In proximity to the
provisions I have quoted, in the next article (sect. 8), is the statute "of unlawful marriages," defining bigamy and declaring its punishment, saying, in general terms, " every person having a husband
or wife living who shall marry any other person" (with exceptions
of no moment here), shall be adjudged guilty of bigamy, providing
(sect. 10) that an indictment may be found against any person for a
second, third or other marriage herein prohibited, in the county in
which he shall be apprehended, and the same proceedings had
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thereon, "as if the offence had been committed therein." Yet
there are no enlarging words affixing themselves to the person of
the citizen, as in the statute before quoted, or bringing within its
purview "a second or other marriage," contracted out of the state;
and therefore, on the trial of one who was indicted for bigamy, the
second marriage having taken place in Canada, it was held as early
as 1855, by a court presided over by the late Judge W. F. ALLEN,
then a justice of the Supreme Court, that this statute had no application; that the second marriage was not an offence against the
laws of this state, because they have no "extra-territorial force."
In like manner, if Barker Van Voorhis had, on his return to this
state, after accomplishing his second marriage, been indicted under
the statutes to which I have referred, either for -bigamy or for
doing a prohibited act, it would necessarily follow that the indictment
would fail. Yet the words of the statute are general ; in themselves they contain no limitation. But we have been referred to
no case, and I think none can be found, where such general words
have been interpreted. so as to extend the action of a statute
beyond-the territorial authority of the legislature, and it is only by
extending it that our courts can take cognisance of acts there committed.
Of the third class, an example is afforded by our statute defining punishment for a second offence. Sect. 8, p. 699, vol. 2,
Rev. Stat., part 4, ch. 1, tit. 6.. "If any person," it says, " convicted of any offence punishable by imprisonment, &c., shall afterwards be convicted of: any offence, he shall be punished" in a
mode prescribed. It is evident that these'words are general, and
'taken literally would apply to "any person" committing an
offence in or out of the state. Applying the mode of construction contended for by the respondent, nothing more could be
necessary. But the legislature show that such isnot its meaning.
By sect. 10 they declare that "every person who shall have been
convicted in any of the United States, or in any district or territory thereof, or in any foreign country, of an offence which if
committed in this state would," &c., "shall upon conviction
of any subsequent offence, committed within this state, be subject
to punishment in the same manner and to the same extent as if
the( first conviction had taken place in a court of this state."
Thus by implication is expressed the opinion of the legislature
that the general words of the eighth section, supra, would not
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meet the case provided for in the tenth section. In fassachusetts,
after a statute extending the prohibition against a second marriage,
under circumstances before stated, to inhabitants of that state
going out of it to evade the .law, it was held that if, in any event,
the foreign marriage could be invalidated, it could not be without
proof of the intent made necessary by statute. Nor without it
could there be a conviction for polygamy: Conim. v. Lane, 113
Mass. 458. A similar distinction exists under the English law.
In 1 Hale P. 0. 662, the ease is stated of a woman who married
in England, and afterward married abroad during her husband's
life. It was held she was not indictable under the statute of the
former country for bigamy, for the offence was committed out of
the kingdom, and the act did not in express terms extend its prohibition to subjects abroad. It is otherwise, however, in regard to
certain offeuces committed in other countries by Englishmen
against their government, viz., murder and slave-trading, because
the statutes have so provided: Warrender v. Warrender, supra.
Now if the criminal court has no jurisdiction to punish the act
when committed out of the state' how has the civil court jurisdiction to prohibit the doing of -the act out of the state. The consequences are the saine in either case, and are prescribed by the
same statute. Whether a man is punished by fine and imprisonment, or by disgrace to himself and the woman he marrjed-the
bastardy of his children-is a difference in degree only. The
severer punishment is in the last alternative. Can the court imply
the right to inflict it? Can it exist unless given in express
language ? I think not. The statute does not in terms prohibit
a second marriage in another state, and it should not be extended
by construction. The mode of construction contended for by the
respondent, if applied to the statutes of treason and duelling and
the punishment of second offences, would make useless those provisions which relate to the conduct of a citizen out of the state, or
the commission of crime in this state by one convicted in another
state. Can they be disregarded, or the legislature charged with
useless enactments? On the contrary, we must give weight and
meaning to them; to their presence in those laws and their
absence in the one of marriages. The difference is essential, and
the yarying language cannot be disregarded. There is first a
prohibition broad as in the act before us, wide enough to take in
all persons within the state, and prohibiting certain acts-a perVOL. XXX.--3
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sonal prohibition. N.1ot content with that, the statutes go further
and extend the same consequences to those acts when committed
out of the state. These provisions are lacking in the law before
us. When, therefore, we consider the legislation of this state
before referred to, and the general rules regulating the territorial
force of the statutes, we cannot but regard the omission to provide
by law for cases like the present as intentional; but if not, in the
language of Lord ELLENBOROUGH, in ZRex v. S/cove, 6 East 518.
"we can only say of the legislature, quod voluit non dixit." This
view is sustained by the course of decision and legislation in
Massachusetts. In 11fedway v. _Ieedham, supra, the plaintiff
sued for the support of certain paupers, one Coffee and his wife,
alleged to have their legal settlement.with the defendant. The
only question on the trial, or the subsequent hearing before the
whole court, respected the validity of the marriage. He -was a
mulatto, and his supposed wife a white woman. They were inhabitants and residents of Massachusetts at the time of their
marriage, and the 'statement is that "as the laws of the province
at that time prohitited all such marriages, they went into the
neighboring province of Rhode Island, and were there married
according to the laws of that province," and returned in'mediately

to their home. Both courts hold the marriage good. Uhe statute
regulating marriages in Massachusetts was at that time like our
own, but the court placed their decision upon the general principle that a marriage good according to the laws of the country
where it is entered into shall be valid in any other country, PARxr., C. J., saying: "This principle is considered so essential
that even where it appears that the parties went into another state
to evade the laws of their own country, the marriage in the foreign
state shall be valid in the country where the parties live ;" and
referring to the statute which declares second marriages absolutely
void, says: "They are only void if contracted within this state :"
West Cambridgce v. Lexington, I Pick. 506, involved the rights
of infant children of Samuel Bemis, paupers, to public support in
that state. The question turned upon the validity of his second
marriage. His first had been dissolved for his adultery. Afterwards, and while his former wife was living, he married in New
Hampshire, and the children were from that union. The court
held that if the marriage had been contracted in Massachusetts, it
would be unlawful and void; but that the laws of no country have
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force outside of its own jurisdiction, and, therefore, one who by
reason of his offence against it is disabled from contracting another
marriage, may lawfully marry'again in a state where no such disability is attached to the offence; and further, having a right to
marry there, he could not, while there, violate the statutes of Iassachusetts against polygamy. It was therefore held that the
children were legitimate, their settlement to be where that of their
father was, and the town entitled to recover for their. support.
The circumstances of Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433, are singularly like those before us, and it was held that although the
second marriage was a clear case of evasion of the laws of the
Commonwealth, it was valid upon the general rule referred to in
the cases already cited. The court also says: "If it shall be
found inconvenient or repugnant to sound principle, it may be
expected that the legislature will explicitly enact that marriages
contracted within another state-which, if entered into here, would
There
be void-shall have no force within this Commonwealth."
is thus recognised a necessity, discussed earlier in this opinion, for
express legislation, if the citizen is to be held bound by the laws
of this state for acts performed by him outside its limits. Legislation to this end was afterwards had; Rev. Stat. of Mass., ch. 75,
sect. 6 ; Tenn. St., ch. 106, sect. 6. Referring to provisions of
the act making void marriages between certain parties, or by persons in prescribed conditions, or under certain circumstances, it
declares, "where persons, resident in this state, in order to evade
the preceding provisions, and with an intention of returning to
reside in this state, go into another state or country and there have
their marriage solemnized, and afterwards return and reside here,
the marriage shall be deemed void in this state." It is not necessary to consider the extent or scope of this statute. It has been
discussed by the courts of this state, and is said by DEWEY, J., in
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Cush. 49, "to have been intended to
meet this class of cases-that is, of individuals fraudulently attempting to evade the laws of Massachusetts, so far as respects
persons divorced for adultery-and to declare such marriages by
the guilty party to be void in this Commonwealth;" or as HUBBARD, J., says, in Sutton v. Warren, 10 Mete. 453, "The only
object of this provision is, as stated by the commissioners in their
reports, to enforce the observance of. our own laws upon our own
citizens, and not suffer them to violate regulations founded in a just
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regard to good morals and sound policy." We have no law in
relation to this subject similar to that of Massachusetts, or our
statutes before cited, in reference to duelling and treason. There
is nothing in the statute to indicate an intention of the legislature
to reach beyond the state to inflict a penalty. Nor can 1 discover
an intent to so impress the citizen with the prohibition as to make
an act which is innocent and valid where performed an offence
when he returns to this state, and himself a criminal for performing it. Every presumption is against such intention. The respondents rest their case upon the general words of the statute.
These, taken in their natural and usual sense, would undoubtedly
embrace the case of the appellant. " No second * * * marriage.
shall be contracted by any person during the lifetime of any
former wife of such person." "Every such marriage shall be
absolutely void."
"No defendant convicted of' adultery shall
marry again until the death of the complainant." Equally broad
are the provisions of the criminal law declaring the punishment
of the offender. They would comprehend every second marriage
wherever celebrated, and take in the citizens of every state. It
cannot be denied that they are subject to explanation and restraint
(Mosher v. People, supra), and the principle upon which it rests
shows the criminal law to have no application to a marriage out of
the state. The same rule was applied in Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y. 466,
where, after a very full discussion of the question involved, it was
decided that the provision of the revised statutes (3 R. S. 994,
sect. 23), declaring a person sentenced upon a conviction of a
felony to be incompetent as a witness, does not apply to a conviction in another state; that it has reference only to a conviction in
this state. The conviction was in Ohio. It was assumed that the
convict would have been incompetent as a witness in that state.
Suppose a judgment here followed his evidence, and it was after-.
wards prosecuted in Ohio. Would it be competent in defence to
show that it was obtained upon evidence inadmissible by the laws
of Ohio? Clearly not. And the reason is stated in the case
cited. " The disqualification is in the nature of an additional
penalty following and resulting fr6m the. conviction, and can not
extend beyond the territorial limits of the state where the judgment was pronounced." He was therefore, a competent witness
in the state of New York. There is, in principle, a close analogy
between the case I have supposed and the one before us. In each
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thre is personal disqualification-in one, to marry; in the other,
to testify. In neither case does the disqualification arise from any
law of nature or of nations, but simply from positive law. Each
deprived the offender of a civil right. Now in case of the witness,
his testimony results in a judgment, a contract of record, to which,
when it reaches Ohio, full effect must be given, and for its enforcement the machinery of the law in that state put in motion. In
the other case, that in hand, a contract is entered into by the
offender, which is a good contract under the laws of the state
where made. If so, it should also follow that to each party
thereto and to their issue every right and privilege growing out of
the relation so established must attach. When, therefore, they
return to this state with the evidence of that contract, can the
courts do more than in the other case ? Are they not limited to
the inquiry whether the contract was valid in the state where
made? And. if it was, how can they deny to the child its
inheritance ? Let me go a little further. Suppose, on the day the
decree of divorce was granted, Barker had also been convicted and
sentenced for felony. He would then have been subject not only to
the statutes above cited, but to that other which declares "that no
person sentenced upon a conviction for felony shall be competent
to testify in any cause :" 3 R. S. 994, sect. 23. Disqualified,
therefore, to marry or to testify, he does both in Connecticut,
brings back to this state the judgment record and the marriage
contract. If the first can not be impeached because of his sentence, neither, as it seems to me, can the other because of his
"conviction."
And for the same reason-viz., that stated by
Greenleaf as the result of the weight'of modern opinion, sanctioned by this court in Sims v. Sims, supra, that personal disqualifications arising, not from the laws of nations, but from
positive laws, especially such as are of .a penal nature, are strictly
territorial, and cannot be enforced in any country other than that
in which they originated.
Second. Nor are we, in the absence of express words to thai
effect, to infer that the legislature of this state intended its law to
contravene the jus gentium, under which the question of the
validity of a marriage contract is referred to the lex loci contraclus,
and which is made binding by consent of all nations. It professedly and directly opei'ates on all. To impugn it is to impugn
public policy ; and while each country can regulate the status of-
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its own citizens, until the will of the state finds clear and unmistakable expression, that must be controlling. "Where," says
MARSHALL, 0. J. (United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 380),
"rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from,
the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such
6bjects."
Our conclusion is that as the marriage in question was valid in
Oonnecticut, the appellant, Rose Van Voorhis, is a legitimate
child of Barker, and as such entitled to share in the estate of the
testator.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, without costs to the plaintiffs or Sarah A. Brintnall, but with costs to
the appellant, Rose Van Voorhis, and to respondents, Ella and
Elias, to be paid out of the estate.
All concur, except

FOLGIaR,

0. J.,'not voting.

The principal case must be regarded as
determining for the state of New York,
a very serious question in the law of
marriage.
Few graver questions are
brought before the courts for determination, than those relating to the validity
of marriage and the legitimacy of offspring. Any adjudication upon so important a subject, and emanating from
so distinguished a court as the New York
Court of Appeals, must necessarily be
of great interest to the profession, and
will be examined witl care, in both
America and England.
It is laid down in the foregoing opinion, that "it is a general rule of law, that
a contract entered into in another state
or country, if valid according to the law
of that place, is valid everywhere." And
cases are cited to the effect that a marriage valid where celebrated, is valid
everywhere. It is submitted, however,
with the greatest deference, that while
the general rule may be as stated, it is
not applicable to the state of facts existing in the particular case, and that the
conclusion announced, cannot be sustained upon the authority of the English

or American cases. In Brook v. Brook,
decided in the House of Lords in 1861,
(9 House of Lords Cases 193), the Lord
Chancellor said: "There can be no
doubt of the general rule, that a foreign
marriage, valid according to the law of
a country where it is celebrated is good
everywhere." But while the forms of
entering into the contract of marriage are
to be regulated by the lex loci
contractus,
the law of the country in which it is
celebrated, the essentials of the contract
depend upon the lox domicilii, the law of
the country in which the parties are
domiciled at the time of the marriage,
and in which the matrimonial residence
is contemplated. Although the forms of
celebrating the foreign marriage may be
different from those required by the law
of the country of domicile, the marriage
may be good everywhere. But if the
contract of marriage is such, in essentials,
as to be contrary to the law of the
country of domicile, and it is declared
void by that law, it is to be regarded as'
void in the country of domicile, though
not contrary to the law of the country
in which it was celebrated. This qualifi-
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cation upon the rule, that a marriage
valid where celebrated is good everywhere, is to be found in the writings of
many eminent jurists who have discussed
the subject. * * * It is quite obvious
that no civilized state can allow its domiciled subjects or citizens, by making .
temporary visit to a foreign country to
enter into a contract, to be performed in
the place of domicile, if the contract is
fbrbidden by the law of the place of
domicile as contrary to religion, or morality, or to any of its fundamental institutions. In this case a marriage celebrated in Denmark, between persons
domiciled in England, and which was
valid according to the law of Denmark,
was held void in England. The man
had married the sister of his deceased
wife, and the parties had gone to Denmark to evade the English law forbidding
such marriages. The latest authoritative
exposition of the English law is to be
found in the opinion pronounced in the
Court of Appeals as late as 1877, in
Sottoyaayor v. Dc Barros, Law Rep., 3
Prob. 1. In that case it is said: "But
it is a well recognised principle of law,
that the question of personal capacity to
enter into any contract, is to be decided
by the law of domicile. It is, however,
urged that this does not apply to the contract of marriage, and that a marriage
valid according to the law of the country
where it is solemnized is valid everywhere. This, in our opinion, is not a
correct statement of the law. The law
of a country where a marriage is solemnized, must alone decide all questions
relating to the validity of th9 ceremony
by which the marriage is alleged to have
been constituted; but as in other contracts, so in that of marriage, pertonal
capacity must depend on the law of
And it was held that where
domicile."
a marriage was celebrated in England
between citizens domiciled in another
country, the marriage would be held void
in England, if the parties were prohibited from marrying by the law of their

domicile, and in an Ermgish work on the
law of domicile, but recently published,
we find it laid down as follows: "The
validity of a marriage depends on two
conditions: first, on the capacity of the
parties to marry each other; secondly,
on the celebration of the marriage in due
form.
The capacity of each of the
parties to a marriage, is to be judged of
by their respective lex doudcilii. Dicey
on Domicile, p. 202.
There are English cases which might
seem at first blush, rot to warrant the
principle thus laid down, but a broad
distinction exists between such cases,
which must not be lost sight of. For
instance a marriage between an English
subject domiciled in England, and a
foreigner, would be held valid in England, although the foreigner might he
prohibited from contracting the marriage
by the law of .his domicile. And this
upon the principle that no country is
bound to recognise the laws of a foreign
state, when they work injustice to its
own subjects: Sottoaayor v. De Barros,

L. R., 3 Prob. D. 1, 6, 7 ; and s. c., on
further hearing, 19 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
76. Again, there are cases which recognise the validity of a marriage, where
the parties have married away from their
own country, for tme purpose of evading
the requirements of the law of domicile
as to the consent of pareuts. But it
is to be reilarked, that the consent of
parents, or others necessary to the validity of a marriage, are considered as
part of the ceremony or form of marriang.
See Dicey on Domicile, p. 203.
In the opinion in the principal case,
much stress is laid upon the Mlassachusetts cases, and especially upon the
case of i1fedway v. Xeedham, 16 Mass.
157 (1819), which was identical in
principle with the one under discussion.
It is interesting, therefore, to note the
criticism passed on that case in the House
of Lords. ".I cannot think," said the
Lord Chancellor, "that it is entitled to
much weight, for the learned judge ad-
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mitted that be was overruling the doetrie of Huberus and other eminent
jurists; he relied on decisions in which
tile forms only, of celebraing the marriage in the country of celebration and
in the country of domicile vere different;
and he took the distinction between cases

setts cases, and maintains that the
doctrine of the lex loci ought not to be
extended to make valid the marriage,
where the party retains his domicile in
the country in which the prohibitory law
prevails, and resorts to another state for
the purpose of evading the law of his
wvhere the absolute prohibition of the own.
The conclusion reached in the prinmarriage is forbidden, on mere motives
of policy, and where the marriage is cipal ease is not only opposed to the
prohibited as being contrary to religion doctrine of the English Court of Appeal, and of the House of Lords, but
on the ground of incest. I myself must
it is equally opposed to the weight of
deny the disinction. If a marriage is
absolutely prohibited in a iy country as authority in this country.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina
being contrary to public policy, and
leading to social evils, I think that the
in 1854, passed upon a state of f.icts in
all respects similar to those existing in
domiciled inhabitants of that country
cannot be permitted, by passing the the principal case. A divorce was obtained in North Carolina, and the guilty
frontier and 'entering another state in
party was prohibited from marrying
which this marriage is not prohibited, to
under a statute similar to the one in
celebrate a marriage forbidden by their
New York. The, parties left the state
own state, and immediately returning to
their own state, to insist on their mar- for the purpose of contracting a marriage being recognised as lawful."
And riage in evasion of the law, and having
Lord CRANWORTH, at the same time, been married in South Carolina, where
remarked, "I also concur entirely with such a marriage was not prohibited, remy noble and learned friend, that the turned into North Carolina. The courts
American decision of JIea''ayv. Need- of the latter state held he marriage
void.
"Altoughi it he true," said
ham, cannot be treated as proceeding
on sound principles of law."
And as Ruxrix, eh. J., "that generally, marto Sutton v. Warren, 10 Metcalf 451 riages are to be judged by the lex loci
(1845), also cited in the principal case, contractus, Yet every country must so far
the Lord Chancellor said: "I am sorry respect its own laws, and their operation
to say, that it rather detrcts from the on its own citizens, as not to allow them
to be evaded by acts in another ceounhigh respect with which I have been in
try, done purposely todefraud them. It
the habit of regarding Araerican decisions, resting upon general jurispru- cannot allow such acts abroad, under the
dence. ** * I am bound to say that pretence that they were lawful there, to
defeat its own laws at home, in their
the decision rested on a total misapprehension of the law of Enxland. * * *
operation vpon persons within her own
This decision, my Lords, may alarm us territory.'" l1lliams v. Oates, 5 Ired.
The subject has recently been
at the consequences which might follow 535.
from adopting foreign notions on such before the same court, and the former
subjects, rather than adhering to the ruling was adhered to. State v. Kennedy,
principles which have guided us and our
76 N. C. 251 (1877).
In this last case
fathers, ever since the Reformation."
Brook v. Brook, supra, is approved, and
See Brook v. Brook, 9 House of Lords the Massachusetts case of iledway v.
Cases 193.
Mr. Burge, too, in his Needham, smpra, noticed and denied.
"As to the formalities of marriage, the
Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign
Laws, p. 188, disapproves the Massachu- lex loci will govern. But when the Law
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of North Carolina declares," said the
court, "that all marriages between negroes and white persons shall be void,
this is a personal incapacity which follows
the parties wherever they go, so long as
they remain domiciled in North Carolina.
And we conceive that it is immaterial
whether they left the state with the intent
to evade its law or not, if they had not
bona fide acquired a domicile elsewhere
at the time of the marriage. * * * A

other cases, was expressly referred to,
and openly repudiated as having been
decided upon' incorrect principles. It
was admitted in a recent case in Massachusetts, in Cotraonnealtiv. Lane, 113
Mass. 458, 465 (1873), that Miedway v.
Nteedain was decided upon the authority
of English cases, in which the question
concerned the form of the marriage., and
not the capacity o? the parties. In
Putnam v. Patnam, 8 Pick. 433 (1829),
the court in following illedway v. NeedItam, declared it was aware of all the
objections to the ruling made in that
case, but that the court in making it
"adopted the rule of the law of England on this subject." .Aledzcay v. Needham must therefore be regarded as based
upon a misconception of the extent of
the principle, that a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere.

law like this of ours would be very idle
if it could be avoided bX merely stepThe
ping over an imaginary line."
same principle was announced in Louisiana in 1855, in Dupre v. Executor of
Boulard, 10 La. Ann. 411. It was
there held tbat a marriage celebrated in
France, between parties domiciled in
Louisiana, and in evasion of the law of
domicile, was void. So in Tennesse in
Next to the Massachusetts cases, the
State v. Bell, 7 Baxter 9 (1872), where
the court declares tlhat the principle that case chiefly relied on in this country, by
a marriage valid where celebrated, is the advocates of the doctrine enunciated
valid everywhere, is confined to the in the principal case, is Stevenson v.
It is
manner and form of the marriage, and Gray, 17 B. Monr. 193 (1856).
does not apply to the capacity of the true that an opinion was expressed in
parties to contract the marriage. And that case, that a marriage, contracted
it was there held that where a man mar- under a similar state of circumstances
ried a woman of color in Mississippi in to those existing in the principal case,
evasion of the law of Tennessee, and would be valid in the place of domicile,
returned to the latter state, he could be and ledway v. Needham was referred to
indicted, although the marriage was valid as an authority for the opinion. But the
in Mississippi. The some doctrine is facts of the case did not make necessary
announced in Virginia in Kinney v. the expression of any opinion upon that
point, and the court expressly declared
Connwealtt, 30 Gratt. 858 (1878).
In this case a negro and a white woman that no conflict could arise, upon the
domiciled in Virginia, went into the facts, "between the lex loc contractus
District of Columbia, and were married and the lex rei site, or between the iex
in evasion of the law of their domicile. domlcilii and either or both of the others," '
Upon their return the marriage was held as the marriage, even though it had
void. We do not understand that in been celebrated in Kentucky, would not
any of these cases, the statute expressly have been, under the peculiar phraseodeclared the marriage void, although logy of their statute void, but only
entered into in another state. They are voidable. That after death of one of
decided upon the authority of Brook v. the parties, the marriage could not be
Brook, supra, holding that the lex don- avoided, and therefore the children must
cilii must determine the capacity of the be regarded as legitimate. And so in
parties. In theVirginia case, last cited, the more recent case of Dannelli v.
Medicay v. Veedlhai, as in most of the Dannelli, 4 Bush 51 (1868), where it
VOL. XXX.-5
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was sought to question the validity of
a man i
which was said to have been
contracted in Switzerland; in evasion of

diately adds that a marriage valid where

celebrated, is valid everywhere.
There
is no doubt of the correctness of both
the law of Lombardy, the place of domi- propositions.
The difficulty is that
cile, the same court declared: " As neither principle applies to the state of
both reason and authority, regard the facts before the court. We have tried to
assent of parties, and the consummation
show that the last principle does not
thereof, by cohabitation, as a legal valid govern cases, in which a marriage has
marriage, unless prohibited by the muni- been contracted out of the state of the
cipal la'ws of the country where celebra- domicile, and in evasion of its laws proted, before we could pronounce this hibiting the parties from marrying. But
marriage as invalid, the laws of Switzer- if the question is to be tried upon princiland making it so would have to be made ples of law which govern in cases of
known to us in a legal manner," which ordinary contracts, we think the same
had not been done. It is thus apparent result is reached, for we find it laid down
that in neither of these cases was it as elementary law in all the text writers,
possible for the court to have held the that no state is bound to enforce conmarriage void as violating the law of the tracts injurious to its own interests, or
in fraud or evasion of its laws, though
domicile.
made outside of its jurisdiction, and
Dicksonv. Dickson, 1 Yeryer (9 Tenn.)
110 (1826), is sometimes cited as sustain- valid when and where made. Story's
ing doctrine similar to that announced in Conf. of Laws, sect. 244.
And see,
the principal case. But in that case the Banchor v. Mfansel, 47 Me. 60 (1859) ;
party, although divorced in Kentucky, Smith v. Godfrey, 8 Foster (N. H.) 331,
and rendered incompetent to marry, had
(1854).
And this was admitted by
acquired a new domicile in Tennessee,
Chief Justice PAnx~n in delivering his
and there married a man whose domicile opinion in Jiedway v. Neeeant. "This
was in that state, where they continued doctrine is repugnant," he said, " to the
to reside until his death. Both parties general principles of law relating to conwere therefore qualified by the law of
tracts; for a fraudulent evasion of the
their domicile to contract the marriage. laws of the country, where the parties
Even had the woman been incompetent have their domicile, could not, except in
the courts of Tennessee, as already the contract of marriage. be protected
pointed out, were under no obligations to under the general principle."
hold the marriage void, inasmuch as this
Great stress was also laid in the princiwould be permitting the laws of Ken- pal case, upon the fact that the legislatucky to work an injustice to the husband ture, while expressly declaring in the
whose domicile was in the fbrmer state. statutes of treason and duelling, that
And in Fuller Y. Fuller, 40 Ala. 301 those offences should be punished though
(1866), a similar state of facts existed,
committed outside the state, yet failed to
and a similar ruling was made.
In
declare in the statute of marriages that
neither case is there even a dictum in a marriage contracted outside the state
favor of the ruling made in the principal should be void. There is, however, a
case. But such dictum may be found in great distinction.
It has never been
Van Storch v. Griffin, 71 Penn. St. 240 deemed necessary to incorporate such a
(1872).1
provision in the marriage laws, for the
It is said in the principal case that a
simple reason that such a provision would
contract entered into in another state, if
simply be in affirmance of the general
valid according to the law of that state,
principle, that ill contracts entered into
is valid anywhere. And the courtimmein another state for the fraudulent evasion
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of the laws of the pin' r of domicile
where the contract is to be performed are
void ab initio, and will not be recognised
in the courts of the home state. Marriage is a civil contract for certain purposes, and is to be performed in the
place where the parties reside, and it was
not supposed that in this, the most important of all contracts to the welfare of
the state as well as to the individual,
the courts would recognise as valid, a
marriage contract entered into in fraud
and evasion of its laws, absolutely prohibiting it as contrary to the public
weal. But on the other hand, if the
state seeks to punish a criminal act, done
by its own citizens outside of the state,
it is equally a well settled principle of
law, that it is necessary to expressly
enact, that such acts shall be deemed
punishable as though committed within
the state.
In the principal case, the disability
to marry is spoken of as a penalty, and
that as such it can have no extra-territorial force. But in Elliott v. Elliott, 38
Md. 357, 363 (1873),the objection was
raised to a law empowering the court in
its discretion to decree in case of divorce, that the guilty party should not
marry during the. lifetime of the t&ther
party, that it was ex post facto in so far
as ic applied to a person nho committed
adultery before the act went into operation. The court, however, held otherwise. "It did not impose," so said the
court, "any new punishment or penalty
upon the adulterer, but simply withlheld
from him relief which lie was never entitled to claim, and left him where he
was before the decree was passed ; under
the disabilities of his marriage contract
which before existed, or which are imposed, not by the Act of Assembly, but
grow out of the marriage contract itself
into which he had voluntarily entered."
If such a decree leaves the guilty party
Ccunder the disabilities of his martiage
contract which before existed," he certainly has no more right to marry after.

such a decree than he had before tie de
crec was pronounced. And as the courts
would be compelled to hold a marriage
void contracted out of the state and
before the divorce, so would it also be
equally compelled to hold the marriage
void contracted out of the state qfter the
divorce.
The principle "Leges extra
territoriumnon obligant" would not apply.
Tie courts will not allow husband and
wife to obtain a divorce in fraud of the
law of their domicile, and if both parties
by consent go into another state merely
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce,
and with the intent of returning to their
former domicile after such divorce is
obtained, upon their return, the courts
of the place of domicile hold such a
Harrison v.
divorce null and void.
Harrison, 20 Ala. 629 ; State v. Armzington, 25 Minn. 29, 37 (1878) ; People v.
And
Dawel, 25 Mich. 247 (1872).
this upon the principle that to each state
belongs the exclusive right and power to
determine for itself the matrimonial status of all its resident and domiciled
citizens. The opinion of Mr. Justice
CooLar, in the Michigan case, above
cited, is exceedingly able and of great,
interest. He says "there are three parties to every divorce-the husband, the
wife, and the state- and the fact that
the first two, consent to the jurisdiction
of the courts of another state cannot giye
validity to the divorce, as the third
party, the state where the parties are
So we
domiciled has not assented."
say, there are three parties to every
marriage,-the man, the woman, and
the state where the parties are domiciled
-and the fact that the first two agree to
assume the matrimonial relation, cannot
create a lawful marriage, if the third
party by prohibiting the marriage refuses
to assent thereto.
From the cases already cited we deduce these principles :
I. That a marriage valid where celebrated, is valid everywhere, so far as all
questions of form are concerned.
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2. That whil.3 the lex loci governs

cade, Id. 470; Powell v. Powell, 18

in questions of form, the lex domicild
determines the capacity of the parties
to enter into the marriage contract.
3. That statutory provisions relating
to the consent of parents, &c., go to the
form of tile matTiage, and not to the
capacity of the parties.
4. That where a marriage is contracted between parties whose domicile
is different, the courts of the place of
domicile will recognise the validity of
the marriage in favor of its own citizen,
although the other party may be disqualified by the law of the foreign domi-

See Stuckey v. Mathes,
Kanus. 371.
That it is
31 N. Y. Supt Ct. 461.
voidable. Cole v. Cole, 5 Sneed 57;
McKinney v. Clarke, 2 Swan. 321.
4. That marriages between slaves
were considered void. Stikes v. Swanson, 44 Ala. 633; Cantelon v. Hood, 56
Id. 519; Smith v. State, 9 Id. 996;
MUalinda v. Gardner, 24 Id. 719; State
v. Samuel, 2 Dev. & Bat. L. 177; Howard v. Howard, 6 Jones L. 235; Hall v.
UnitedStates, 2 Otto 27 ; Fwing v. Bibb,
7 Bush 654; Steward v. Jfunchandler,
2 Id. 278; McReynolds v. State, 55
5 Cald. (Tenn.) 18.
5. That marriages between Indians
according to Indian customs are considered valid, although the husband has
the right to dismiss the wife at his volition, and the tribe live within the state
limits. Boyer v. Dively, 58 Mo. 510;
W~all v. Williamson, 11 Ala. 839 ; Mlorgan v. MI[cGhee, 5 Hump. 13 ; Johnson v.
Johnson, 30 Mo. 72.
6. That a marriage procured through
the fraud of one party, is generally said
to be -void. See Schouler Dom. Rel. 35.
Reeves Dom. Rel. 206; 2 Kent's Com.
767. 1 Bishop on Mar. and Div. sect.
115.
In Tomppert v. Tonippert, 13
Bush 326 (1877), the Kentucky court
repudiates this doctrine, and declares it
is only voidable and not void. And see
Guilford v. Oxford, 9 Conn. 326.
7. That the statutory provisions requiring that no marriage be celebrated
until after a license has issued, &c., are
directory merely, and will not invalidate
a marriage performed without compliance
therewith, in the absence of express
provisions declaring such marriages void.
Ely v. Gammnel, 52 Ala. 584, 586;
Beggs v. State, 55 Id. 112; Parton v.
Hervey, 1 Gray 119 ; Mjlfford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48 ; Cargile v. Wood,
63 Mo. 501; Holabird v. Ins. Co., 2
Dillon 167 ; Rundle v. Pegrarn, 49 Miss.
751 ; Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mih.
133. But i. here the statutory condition,

cile.
5. When a new domicile is acquired
in good faith, the former incapacity
ceases, and the capacity cf. the party
must be -determined by the law of the
new domicilb.
In addition to these principles we
briefly note :
1. That polygamous and incestuous
WViqhtmarriages are everywhere void.
man v. lVightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343;
Hutchins v. Kinamell, 31 Mich. 126, 134;
Sutton v. Warren, 10 M1etc. 451 ; Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 463;
State v. Ross, 76 N. C. 245.
2. That marriages between infants are
voidable and not void. Cooley v. State,
55 Ala. 162; Beggs v. State, 55 Id.
108; Frost v. Youqht, 37 Mich. 65.
In the case last cited, it is held that the
Michigan statute rendering males of
eighteen and females of sixteen, competent to' contract marriage, makes the
marriage actually entered into by them
valid, but that it does not empower such
persons while under the age of twentyone to make valid executory contracts of
marriage, for breach of which suits may
be broughit.
3. That marriages between persons,
one of whom is insane at th time of
marriage, are void. Middleborough v.
Bochester, 12 Mass. 363; ]Wiagyire v.
.Tetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271; Cruinp v.
Horgan, 3 Ired. Eq. 91 ; Johnson v. Kin-
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have not been complied with, it is held
that there must be some independent
proof of an actual and voluntary consent, indicating the existence of a deliberately recognised marriage.
And
positive evidence of non-assent is of
weight against an irregular ceremony.
Kopke v. People, 43 Mich. 45 (1880).
S. That a marriage entered into
through duress is void, but not when
fear arises from an arrest and prosecution for bastardy. Williams v. State,
44 Ala. 24 ; Bonnett v. Honnet, .33 Ark.
156. See Willard v. Willard, 6 Baxter (renn.) 298.
9. That there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which prevents the states from declaring all miscegenetic marriages void. State v. Hairston, 63 N. C. 451; State v. Reinhard,
63 Id. 547 ; Kinney v. Coanmonwealth,

30 Gratt. 858; Green V. State, 58 Ala.
190.
We shall conclude this note with the
following quotation from Story's Conf.
of Laws, p. 178 (7th ed.): "If the
incapacity of the parties is such that no
marriage could be solemnized between
them, * * * and without changing their
domicile they go into some other country
where no such limitation or restriction
exists, and there enter into the formal
relation with a view to return and dwell
in the country in which such marriage is
prohibited by positive law, it is but proper to say, that a proper self-respect (of
the state or government in prohibiting
such a marriage) would seem to require
that the attempted evasion would not
be allowed to prevail."
HENRY WADE RlOGERS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
WIREBACH'S EXECUTOR a. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF EASTON.
A lunatic who is an accommodation endorser without consideration upon a
promissory note, and who has derived no advantage from his endorsement, either to
himself or his estate,. is not liable to a bona fide holder, although the latter had no
knowledge of the lunacy.
Error to the Common Pleas of Northampton county.
Assumpsit against the executor of Wii'ebach, upon a promissory
note drawn by one Christman to the order of Wirebach, and
endorsed by the latter. Plea, non assumpsit.
Upon the. trial the following facts appeared: In January 1,876,
Wirebach endorsed a note of $4000 jointly with Richards and
Christman for the accommodation of Stocker & Co., a firm doing
business in South Easton, which note was discounted by the First
National Bank of Easton. Besides this note of $4000, the bank
held at the time ten other notes of Stocker & Co., upon which
Wirebach was not an endorser, but upon which Richards and
Christman were endorsers, and these notes were carried along
from time to time in different amounts, and maturing at different
dates. In the beginning of December 1876, after one of the notes
fell due and went to protest, Christman had an interview with the'
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president of the bank. It was then arranged that the said notes.
eleven in number, should be replaced by one note, and that Christman should procure Wirebach to become endorser on the said
note, and that Richards and Christman should be the drawers.
Stocker & Co. were rot to be parties to the new note.
In pursuance of this agreement, Christman, on December 7th
1876, met Wirebach by appointment, and went with him to the
bank, where, in the presence of the president, who had prepared
a calculation of the total amount of the eleven notes, the note in
suit was duly executed for $10,075.
The defendant set up that both before and at the time of the
execution of the original note and the renewal, Wirebach was
unsound in mind and incapable of contracting, and that the
bargain was unconscionable, and had been obtained by undue
influence and fraud. The testimony as to the insanity of Wirebach was conflicting, but there was no direct testimony on the
part of the defendant that the officers of the bank knew of Wirebach's condition, except in so far as they might have inferred it
from his actions while the transaction was being carried on.
Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant took
this writ.
Edward J. Fox ( I. S. Kirkpatrick with him), for the plaintiff in error, cited, Mfitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick: 431 ; Taylor v.
-Dudley, 5 Dana 311); Thornton v. Appleton, 29 Maine 298;
Webster v. Woodford,. 3 Day 100; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn.
204; XMorris v. Cla,. 8 Jones 216; Lazell v. Pinnick & MIfatson,
1 Tyler 247 ; Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304 ; Bank v. Mfoore,
28 P. F. Smith 407.
W. T. Schuyler ( William Mutchler with him), for the defendant in error, cited, La Rue v. Gilkyson, 4 Barr 375; Beals v.
Se, 10 Id. 56; Bank v. M~oore, 28 P. F. Smith 407; Molton
v. Camroux, 2 Exch. 487; Elliot v. Ince, 7 DeG., Al. & G. 487;
Wilder v. Weakley, 34 Ind. 181; Benjamin on Sales, sect. 29,
1 Am. Ed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TRiuNKEY, J.-Where a person fairly and in good faith sells
property, or loans money to a lunatic who appears to be sane and
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is not known by the vendor or lender to be insane, and who has
not been found to be a lunatic by judicial proceedings, and the
lunatic receives and uses the same, whereby the contract becomes
so far executed that the parties cannot be. placed in statu quo, such
a contract cannot afterwards be set aside, or payment refused by
the lunatic or his representatives: (La Rue v. Gilkyson, 4 Barr
375; Beals v. See, 10 Id. 56 ; Lancaster County Bank v. lfoore,
28 P. F. Smith 407 ; Wilder v. Jfealcley, 34 Ind. 181 ; E lliott v.
Ince, 7 De G., M. &.G. 475, 487). In Blliott v. Ince it is remarked that "the result of the authorities seems to be that dealings
of sale and purchase by a person apparently sane, though subsequently found to be insane, will not be set aside against those who
have dealt with him on the faith of his being a person of competent
understanding." Chief Justice GiBsox based the lunatic's liability
in such cases on the principle that where a loss must be borne by
one of two innocent persons it shall be borne by him who occasioned
it; he is liable to bear the consequences of his infirmity, as he is
liable to bear his misfortunes.
There can be no binding executory agreement where one of the
parties is bereft of reason-a capacity to contract is absolutely
necessary. An insane person is incapable of committing a crime
or making a contract, yet it is common to speak of his torts and
his contracts, and on many of them he is liable in a civil action.
One who knowingly sells goods to an insane person, necessary for
his use, may recover their value on the same principle that an
infant is liable for necessaries he purchases. His liability for
necessaries and suitable articles is deemed rather a benefit than a
disadvantage to him.
It is noticeable that in this Commonwealth, where the lunatic
has been held liable, there was neither imposition nor want of full
consideration for the amount of liability, and when not for necessaries, the opposite party had no knowledge of the lunacy. Thus,
in Lancaster County Banc v. M2foore, supra, stress was put on the
fact that the bank had no knowledge of Moore's insanity, and in
good faith loaned the money which was placed to his credit and
checked 'out by him. It was held to be within the doctrine of
Beals v. See, that the contract was executed so far as the consideration was concerned, and that the rule which prevents insane
persons obtaining the property of innocent parties and retaining
both property and price, required payment of the note: Snyder v.
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Laubaclh, 7 W. N. C.464, is where York's endorse'ment of the
note was merely a renewal of an endorsement made when he was
unquestionably of sound mind; and it was held that as he was clearly
liable on the note of which the note in suit waq a renewal, there
was full consideration, and the case was within the decision in
Lancaster County Bank v. Moore. The consideration was a debt
for the amount of the renewal note. So in .Kneedler's Appeal,
37 Leg. Int. 504, a judgment entered on a bond by virtue of a
warrant of attorney was allowed to stand because the lunatic,
acting by advice of counsel, received the full consideration which
he prudently applied in payment of his undisputed debts, and the
plaintiff had no knowledge of the insanity when the money was
loaned. Of like purport are every one of the cases decided elsewhere, which are cited and relied on by the defendant in error.
In most if not all cases where an insane person has been held
answerable as if his contract were binding, he received and enjoyed an actual benefit from the contract.
The question now presented is: Will an action lie on the accommodation endorsement of a promissory note by a lunatic? If the
determination of this was not made, it was very clearly indicated
in Moore v. Rershey, 9 Norris 196. There the action was by an
endorsee against the maker of a promissory note, and evidence
was offered to prove that the maker had received no consideration for the note, which fact the plaintiff had admitted in conversation, proof having been made that the maker was insane, but
the offer was rejected, the court below ruling that as the note in
suit was commercial paper and the plaintiff a holder for value, the
consideration could not be inquired into. This was held to be
,error. PAxsON, J., said, "We place our ruling upon the broad
ground that the principle of commercial law above referred to does
not apply to commercial paper made by madmen. * * * The true
rule applicable t6 such cases is, that while the purchaser of a
promissory note is not bound to inquire into its consideration,
he is affected by the sfatus of the maker, as in the case of a married woman or a minor. In neither of these cases can be recover
against the maker. In the case of a lunatic, however, he
may recover,'provided he had no knowledge of the lunacy, and
the note was obtained without fraud and upon a proper consideration."
"There must be a limit to the civil responsibility of persons of
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unsound mind, otherwise their property would be at the mercy
of unscrupulous and designing men."
If the holder could recover against one who was insane when
he endorsed or made the note without consideration therefor, no
wider door.could be opened for the swindler to despoil such helpless persons of their estates. An infant who makes or endorses a
note may, by his representative, plead his infancy as a complete
defence. In like manner, a lunatic may plead insanity and want
of consideration. The consideration respects himself, not the
holder, who may have given value to his endorser. If the :Pact
that the holder had paid value were enough, the lunatic could not
defend for fraud upon him or for want of consideration. Then an
innocent holder could recover, though the judgment would sweep
away the lunatic's entire estate, and he had not been benefited a
farthing. Nor would a nominal sum be sufficient. It is said.that
the law protects those who cannot protect themselves; but it would
be sorry protection if one holding a valid note against a helpless
man for $4000 could get it renewed for $10,000, and recover the
full amount of the renewal-note. The consideration must be fair
and conscionable, and then it is proper. When it is a pre-existing
debt, or money loaned, its measure is certain; and the insane man
is liable for no more than the amount of such debt or loan. The
holder of a maaman's note stands in no better position than the
payee. An accommodation maker or endorser, in fact, is a surety
for the principal debtor; and, when he is an infant or insane person, he or his representative may defend as in other forms of contract. We are not persuaded that commercial or public interests
require an adjudication that a lunatic who signs a contract as
surety, or as accommodation maker or endorser, is liable for the
debt of another man.
This action is upon a note for $10,075.92, which was given to
the bank to take up notes of Stocker & Co., which were endorsed
by Richards and Christman. J. 0. Wirebach was accommodation
endorser, and this was known to the bank. He was an endorser
on one of the former notes for $4000. It is alleged by the defence
that Wirebach was incapable of making a contract by reason of
insanity, not only at the date of the note in suit, but also at the
date of said former note. If this fact were established the verdict
should have been for defendant. And if he were sane when he
endorsed the prior note, and insane at the time he endorsed the
VOL. XXX.-5
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note in suit, he is not liable for the one in suit, as it is not a mere
renewal-note. The learned judge of the Common Pleas instructed
the jury that, "to entitle the defendant to a verdict in this case,
he must establish by satisfactory evidence that Wirebach was of
unsound mind on the 7th of December 1876, and that the bank
had notice or knowledge of such unsoundness." We are of opinion
that it was error to rule that the defence failed, unless the bank had
such notice or knowledge. This ruling pervaded the charge and
answers to points of defendant; there is no occasion for special
remark on each of the first nine specifications of error. We are
not satisfied that the court erred in charging that there was no
evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence on the
part of the bank, or of fraudulent practices by Christman or Wirebach, to authorize submission of these questions. Fraud is hot to
be presumed from the mere fact of endorsement, even by a man
feeble in mind and body. It is common for one friend, though
possessed of strong mind, to ruin himself financially by endorsing for another; and while it is very imprudent, if not rash, it
has never been considered unconscionable, except when procured
by some artifice or fraud, of which there must be some evidence.
Were the endorser weak-minded, less evidence would be required
to establish the fraud.
None of the assignments relative to the offers of testimony by
the defendant are sustained. One is to the effect that the defendant-was prevented from proving by Mr. Scott that Wirebach was a
shrewd, intelligent business man prior to 1875. Why the court
overruled the direct question is not stated, but the witness was
properly examined, and testified that Wirebach's manner of conversation was good, that he was a fluent talker, intelligent, had a
good memory and was an intelligent business man. All of the
witnesses were allowed to testify, so far as they knew, as to his
appearance, manner, conversation and acts, before and after the
commencement of his alleged unsoundness of mind. Nor do we
think that the insolvency of Richards and Christman, or the value
of Wirebach's property at the date of the endorsement, or that
Wirebach once took an interest in, and was well informed on political matters, were facts so strictly pertinent that it was error to
reject them. The admissibility of such facts depends much on
other testimony in the cause, and most generally safely rests in the
judgment of the court where the cause is tried.
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The learned judge seems to have carefully considered his rulings,
and to have fairly submitted to the jury to determine as to the
alleged insanity of Wirebach at the time of the endorsement. But
for the single error relative to notice to or knowledge by the bank
of. the insanity of Wirebach, the case must go back for another
trial.
Judgment reversed, and venire facias de novo awarded.
The doctrine that a contract entirely
executory on both sides cannot be etiforced against an insane person, is too
well settled to need any citation of
authorities. (See the cases collected in
Ewell's Leading Cases on Disabilities,
525.)
As to contracts wholly or in part executed, there is, however, some difference
of opinion among the authorities. In
S aver v. Phielps, 11 Pick. 304; s. c.,
Ewell's Lead. Cas. 610, decided in
1831, which was trover for a promissory
note pledged to the defendant by the
plaintiff while he was insane, although
it did not appear that the contract to
secure the performance of which the
pledge was made was an executed one,
the distinction between executed and
executory contracts was not regarded by
the court as at all material, and it was
held that it was not a legal defence that
the defendant, at the time he took the
pledge, was not apprised of the plaintiff's being insane, and had no reason to
suspect it, and did not overreach him
nor practice any fraud or unfairness.
See, also, Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray 279 ;
Bond v. Bond, 7 Allen 1; Henry v.
Fine, 23 Ark. 417 ; ,omers v. Pmphrey,
24 Ind. 238; Chew v. Bank of Baltimore, 14 Md. 318; Hovey v. Hobson, 53
Ale. 453; Fitzgerald v. Reed, 17 Miss.
94. Were the point not settled by
authority, it would seem difficult, on
principle merely, to answer the position
taken in Searer v. Phelps, that "the
fairness of the defendant's conduct cannot supply the plaintiff's want of
capacity," except, perhaps, in the case
of contracts for necessaries, which stand

upon a different ground.

The

first

proposition of the" court in the principal

case, however, is supported by the clear
weight of authority, both English and
American. Besides the case of La Rue
v. Gilkyson and the other cases cited by
the court, see to the same point the
leading case of Molton v. Camroux, 2
Exch. 487 ; s. c., affirmed in 4 Exch.
17, decided in 1848 ; Beavan v. Ml.eDonnell, 9 Excb. 309; s.c., 10 Id. 184;
Campbell v. Hooper, 3 Sm. & G. 153;
Hassard v. Smith, 6 Ir. Eq. Rep. 429;
Young v. Stevens, 48 N. R.
133;
Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa 343;
.'ltzhugh v. lVilcox, 12. Barb. 237;
Person v. Warren, 14 Id. 488; Youger
v. Skinner, 14 N. J. Eq. 389; Ballard
v. McKenna, 4 Rich. Eq. 358; Sims v.
JfcLure, 8 Id. 286 ; Mfatthiessen 4- W.
Refining Co. v. Mgcilfahon, 38 N. J. Law
537: McCormick v. Littler, 85 Il. 62;
Scanlan v. Cobb, Id. 299. See, also,
Lincoln v. BucLknaster, 32 Vt. 658;
Long v. Long, 9 Md. 348.
In Molton v. Camroux, the lunatic purchased certain annuities for his life of a
society which, at the time, had no
knowledge of his unsoundness of mind,
the transaction being in the ordinary
course of the affairs of human life, and
fair and bonaa fide on the part of the
society, and it was held that, after the
death of the lunatic, his personal representatives could not recover back the
premiums paid for the annuities.
In Campbell v. Hooper, the principle
of Mfolton v. Camroux was applied to a
bill for the foreclosure of a mortgage as
against the real and personal representatives of a mortgagor who was a lunatic
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at the time of the execution of the
mortgage, it appearing that the money,
to secure the repayment of which the
mortgage was executed, was honestly
paid, and that no advantage was taken
by the mortgagee, and that he had no
knowledge of the lunacy when he paid
the money.
In Behrens McKenzie, defendant was
held liable on an injunction bond executed by him while insane, the enjoyment of the benefit of the writ being the
consideration enjoyed by him.
The limitations upon the doctrine
stated at the outset in the principal case,
that, in order to hold the lunatic liable,
there must have been neither imposition
nor want of full considera'ion for the
amount of liability, and that, when not
for necessaries, the opposite party must
have had no knowledge of the lunacy,
are supported alike by reason and
authority. The cases all seem to concede that, except in the case of necessaries, the protection of the law is not to
be extended to one knowing the insanity
of the party with whom lie is contracting. See Henry v. ine, 2$?Ark. 420.
And it is sufficient notice where the circumstances known in regard to the
other's mental condition were such as to
convince a reasonable and prudent man
of his insanity, or even to put him on
inquiry by which he might, if reasonably
prudent, have learned the fct: Lincoln
v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 658.
It is generally considered that an
adjudication of insanity is sufficient to
avoid subsequent contracts. In McCormick v. Littler, 85 fI. 62, however, it
was held that, although a r~erson may
have been" adjudged insane, yet, if no
conservator has been appointed, and he
is in the management of hi business,
and there is nothing about his appearance to indicate his incapacity to contract, if he purchases an article necessary and useful in his business, at a fair

and reasonable price, the seller having
no notice of his having been adjudged
insane, he will be liable to pay the price
he agreed to pay.
The limitation upon the rule in
ilfolton v. Camroux, laid down in the
principal case, that the consideration
must be full, fair and conscionable, and
the decision arrived at in applying the
law to the facts of the principal case
.place the law upon this subject upon a
satisfactory basis. Although the rule in
Seaver v. Phelps, as a matter of mere
principle, seems well founded, unquestionably as a matter of policy and justicc
the jule in Molten v. Carnroux works out
more satisfactory and just results. If a
lunatic could be held liable upon an ac,commodation endorsement, even though
in the hands of a bona fide holder, the
protection which it is the object of the
law to extend to this unfortunate class
of persons would amount to nothing.
The rule of M.olton v. Comroux, as to
executed contracts, *ith the above limitations, affords all the protection that can
safely be extended to persons dealing
with lunatics, without practically abolishing the disability itself; and the principal case is important as being probably
the first that clearly lays down and
applies this salutary limitation. In Van
Patton v. Beals, 46 Iowa 62, it was
held that an-insane person who signs as
surety a note given for an antecedent
debt, cannot be held liable thereon, even
though the person taking the note had no
knowledge of the incapacity of the
surety. In that case, however, Seaver
v. Phelps is cited with approval, and no
nse has been found, other than Moore v.
Hershey, cited in the principal case,
which discusses the question there involved. Altogether, the decision is a
satisfactory one, and will doubtless
become a leading case in this branch of
the law.
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ST. JOSEPH FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE
COMPANY.

A verbal agreement to insure is binding, and in case of loss will be specifically
enforced against the insurer.
Henning v. United States Insurance Company, 47 Mlo. 425, distinguished.
The only element of a valid contract of insurance not expressly agreed upon in
this case was the risk. The insuring company, however, was only authorized to
insure against fire on land and marine risks elsewhere, and the subject-matter of the
insurance was a stock of goods in store. Held, that from this it could properly be
inferred that the risk insured against was fire.
The method of enforcing specific performance of a verbal contract to issue a
policy of insurance, after a loss has occurred, is not to compel the issuance of the policy but to decree payment of the money as if the policy had issued.
It is no defence to an action to compel specific performance of a contract to issue
a policy of insurance that the policy, if issued, would have contained a prohibition
against additional insurance, without the consent of the insurer written on the policy,
and that the plaintiff had obtained additional insurance without such consent.
Where a policy contains a prohibition against additional insurance without the
consent of the insurer written thereon, if notice of such additional insurance be
given to an agent of the insurer and he assents thereto, it will be sufficient though
his assent be verbal only.
It is no defence to an action to compel specific performance of a contract to issue
a policy of insurance that the policy, if issued, would have contained a requirement
that in case of loss the insurer should be forthwith furnished with proofs of loss,
and that plaintiff had not complied with this requirement.
If an insurance company whose agent has made a verbal contract to issue a policy,
upon being applied to for the policy by the party entitled, after a loss has occurred,
refuses to issue the policy on the ground that it is not liable on the contract, it cannot
afterward depend on the ground that proofs of loss were not furnished in time.
If the payee in a note receives a mortgage with the understanding that he is to
nold it as a security for the payment of the note, only until he can assure himself
of the solvency of another party who is offered as surety, and upon inquiry he
ascertains that the proposed surety is solvent and the signature of the latter to the
note is procured, and thereafter the payee receives the note and keeps it for several
months without objection, the mortgage will be deemed satisfied and discharged.
Parol evidence is admitsible to show that a mortgage has been fully discharged,
or to explain or contradict the consideration clause.

APPEAL

from Buchanan Circuit Court.

Suit in equity.

The local agent of defendant at Warrensburg, solicited plaintiffs, who were merchants at that place, to take $2500 insurance
upon their stock of goods, to continue one year. Plaintiffs consented, paid the premium, and received from the agent the follow-

ing receipt:
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Warrensburg, December 5th 1873.
Received of Baile & Ridenour $43.75, paid as premium on $2500
insurance in the St. Joseph and Marine Insurance Company of
St. Joseph, for which I agree to deliver a policy.
E. H. SHOTWELL, agent, &c.
Plaintiffs' application and the premium paid were forwarded by
Shotwell to the home office of the company at St. Joseph, but
within a few days, and before the delivery of the policy, plaintiffs'
store and stock were destroyed by fire. The day after the fire
plaintiffs notified the defendant, who immediately sent its secretary
to Warrensburg to -inquire into the case. In the prosecution of
his inquiries he took the depositions of plhintiffs. Shortly after
this plaintiffs demanded a policy of defendant, who refused to
issue one, and denied all liability for the loss on the ground that
nothing but a written or printed policy, signed by the president
and attested by the secretary, could impose a legal liability on the
company, and none such had ever been issued.
No formal proofs of' loss were furnished to the company until
after the lapse of ten months, but no objection on that score was
made by the company until the filing of the answer in this case.
The answer denied liability on the ground that no verbal contract
of insurance was binding- on defendant under its charter and the
laws of the state, and further set up several affirmative defences
growing out of the character and conditions of the policy that
defendant would have issued if it had issued any: 1. That the
policy would have contained a prohibition against .additional insurance without the consent of the defendant written on the policy,
and that there was a breach of such conditions. 2. That the
policy would have contained a condition against misrepresentations
in the application, and that thiere was a misrepresentation, in this,
that it was stated, in' the application that the plaintiffs' stock of
goods was unincumbered, when in fact there was a valid subsisting
chattel mortgage thereon. 3. That the policy would have contained a condition that as soon as possible after a loss the insured
should render a particular account of the loss duly verified, and
that this condition had not been complied with. Plaintiffs' replies
to these defences sufficiently appear in the opinion.
The case was submitted to the court on the pleadings and
proofs, and there was a judgment for the defendant.
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-Doniphan& Reed and'Orittenden& Cockrell, for appellants.
B1. -. Barnard,for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHERWOOD, 0. J.-1. The validity of the contract is the first
point demanding attention. The charter of the defendant company is that furnished by the general law: ch. 67, Gen. Stat.,
1865, p. 353. The concluding words of sect. 1, of that chapter,
require that the "conditions of all policies issued by such company, shall be written or printed on the face thereof;" and
sect. 8, of the same chapter, provides that "all policies and contracts of insurance and instruments of guarantee, made by said
company, shall be subscribed by the president or president pro
tempore, and attested by the secretary." Similar language to that
just quoted was passed upon by this court in Henning v. Uited
States Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 425, and it was held that with such
charter and by-laws the company could make no original and oral
contract 6f insurance. In that case, however, sect. 6 of ch. 62,
Gen. Stat., 1865, was overlooked. That section, which has been
on the statute-book for over thirty-five years (Stat., 1845, p. 232,
sect. 8), provides that " parol contracts may be binding on aggregate corporations, if made by an agent duly authorized by a corporate vote, or under the general regulations of the corporation, and
contracts may be implied on the part of such corporations from
their- corporate acts, or those of an agent whose powers are of a
general character." Passing upon the effect of this section, it
was held in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of ,Missouri, in an action between the forementioned parties, that construed in the light of the general law, the charter of
the insurance company did not disable it from making a binding
contract of insurance without writing : Renning v. United States
Ins. Go., 2 Dillon 0. 0. 26.
This view is certainly the better one, even where there is no
such general provision as that above quoted, making oral contracts
of aggregate corporations valid. It must now be considered as the
wellsettled doctrine by nearly universal concurrence of the authorities that oral agreements of insurance are enforceable, although
the charter of the company contains similar provisions to those
contained in chap. 67, supra. The principle underlying these
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decisions is this: That the right to make contracts of insurance,
like any other right of contracting, exists at common law, unless
prohibited by statute; that the contract of insurance having its
origin in mercantile law and usage, the distinction which denies
the power to enter into such a contract, except in particular modes
and forms, is without foundation, and repugnant to, and inconsistent with, that general capacity of contracting which the common
law concedes to every person ordinarily competent to enter into
binding engagements; that the provisions of the charter of a company that they shall have the right to make contracts of insurance
by the signature of a president, &c., are regarded by the courts
as merely enabling and not restrictive 'of the general power to
effect contracts in any other mode not unlawful, dictated by convenience; and that "the distinction between a contract to insure
or to issue a policy and the policy itsey is obvious and constantly
recognised by the courts :" May on Insurance, sects. 14, 22, 23,
128; Kelly v. Gommwnwealth ns. Go., 10 Bosw. 82; Sanborn v.
Fireman'sIns. Go., 16 Gray 448 ; Trustees v. Brooklyn Fire Ins.
Go. v. Sleaw, 94 U. S. 574;
Cns.
Co., 19 N. Y. 305; Relief Fire
New Egland, fc. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 536; 56 Mo. 371; _Henning v. llns." Go., supra. In view, however, of the broad statutory
provisions heretofore cited, relating to the power of aggregate corporations to contract orally, all difficulty as to the power to make, in
the present circumstances, an oral contract of insurance, vanishes.
Besides that, sect. 8, supra, requiring the signature of the president, &c., uses no prohibitory words; relates not to agreements to
insure, but only to policies when completed and ready for official
signature. It is unnecessary to the proper determination of this
case, that the one already cited from our own reports, and greatly
relied on by the defendant, be overruled; but it is not unworthy
of remark that the utterances were in that case for the most part,
almost, if not altogether', obiter, since therein it is distinctly
asserted that the 'contract in that instance was "nothing but a
naked verbal agreement * * * sued upon. This is denied, and
there is no proof of it." So that that case could have been very
briefly disposed of, as having no evidential foundation requiring
either judicial discussion or determination. Be that as it may,
the doctrine announced in that case does not dominate this one,
for the reason that that case was a suit at law on an alleged oral
and completed agreement; this, a proceeding in equity, to compel
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that to be done which already upon sufficient consideration had
been agreed should be done. And the case under discussion
expressly recognised the principle annQunced in 31arine Ins. Co.
v. Union, Mutual Ins. Co., 19 How. 319, as well as in numerous
other cases cited by plaintiffs, that equity will specifically enforce
"agreements to make insurance." Conceding, then, as we must,
from the authorities and statutory provisions above noted, the
power of the defendant company to make such an agreement to
insure the goods and merchandise of plaintiffs as can be enforced
in equity, was a contract possessing such necessary constituent
elements as equity will recognise and enforce made in the case
at the bar? We have no doubt on this score, and for these reasons: The evidence discloses a contract for a policy of insurance
negotiated for between plaintiffs and defendants' local agent, the
reception of and receipt for the required premium, the subjectmatter insured, the amount of insurance and the duration of the
policy. The only element of the contract of insurance left incomplete by the evidence is the risk insured against, but this is
supplied by reasonable intendment and necessary implication
arising from the nature of the business engaged in by the defendant company-fire insurance on land and marine insurance elsewhere, and by the circumstances and situation of the property
insured. And it is competent-to infer the nature of the risk
insured against. Thus it has been held that when the hazard is
fire alone, and the subject an unfinished vessel never afloat for a
voyage, and not a subject for marine insurance, a contract to
insure must be regarded as a fire insurance: Eureca Ins. Co. v.
.Robinson, 56 Penna. St. 256.
The evidence further discloses the forwarding of the premium
thus received to the home office, the notification of the company
by its local agent of the occurrence of the fire, the immediate
coming to Warrensburg of Rice, the secretary of defendants, and
its special adjuster of losses, and his taking of the depositions
of plaintiffs as to the cause of the fire, the amount of goods
burned and the aggregate sum of insurance, and the retention of
the premium. If from these facts a contract to issue a policy
.cannot be implied on the part of the defendant, or even be
regarded as well established by the evidence, it would be hard
to conceive of a case furnishing sufficient data to bind with
obligatory force a recalcitrant corporation. And it would be
VoL. XX.-6
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intolerable that such corporation should ratify the acts of its
local agent in manner as aforesaid, receive the consideration for
issuing a policy, retain that consideration, and yet refuse to do
the act for which that consideration was given.
II. We have already seen that a valid oral contract to insure
having been made, eqiity will specifically enforce such initial, or
preliminary, contract. This is done where a loss has occurred,
not by actually requiring that a policy of insurance be issued, but
by a decree for payment of the loss as if a policy had issued.
This method of affording relief, of administering remedial justice,
proceeds upon the ground of circuity of action: May on Insurance,
sect. 565, and cases cited; and doubtless upon further ground that
equity, once possessed of a cause, will, before releasing its grasp
on the res, avoid a multiplicity of suits by doing full, adequate
and complete justice between the parties, by entering that judgment to which the party will be ultimately entitled: Real JEstate
Savinq Inst. v. Collonious, 63 Mo. 290.
III. The first special defence of defendants' answer cannot prevail. There being no policy of insurance. issued, the endorsing of
subsequent insurance on a non-issued policy can scarcely be
regarded as within the domain of possibility. The law never
requires impossibilities. Defendant failing and refusing to issue a
policy according to contract, cannot visit upon plaintiffs the prejudicial results arising solely out of its own non-performance: Eureka
Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 56 Penn St. 256.
Plaintiffs not being furnished with a policy of insurance containing the condition of its issuance, it would be most unreasonable to
require at their hands a compliance with those unknown conditions.
No policy having been issued, nothing more, in justice to defendant, was requisite than that it be notified of subsequent insurance:
Bureka.Ins. Co. v. Robinson, supra. This was done, as shown by
the testimony, the next day after the insurance was effected, by informing the local agent of such subsequent insurance in the
Planters. The agent, when notified, according to the testimony of
one witness, said "that was all right ;" and according to the testimony of another witness, made no objection, so that, even had there
been a policy of insurance actually issued, this conduct of the
agent would have rendered the notice of subsequent insurance
equivalent in the circumstances to an endorsement on the 15olicy
of the fact contained in such notice. The decided tendency of
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modern adjudication is in this direction, and the company is
held estopped from insisting on a forfeiture of the policy
because the stipulation referred to has not been literally complied with: May on Insurance, sect. 370; Hayward v. Ins. Co.,
52 Mo. 181.
IV. The second special defence is as unmaintainable as the first.
The testimony shows very clearly that though technically incorrect,
the answer given that there was no mortgage on the insured property was actually true; and the evidence, when carefully examined, shows no conflict on this point. That evidence discloses that
the deed of trust was given for a special purpose, and only for that
purpose-i. e., to remain as a security for the note given by Ridenour to Congdon, for the latter's interest in the goods, until communication was had with Ohio, the endorsement of Glandner on
the note obtained, and Congdon should be satisfied with the solvency of the endorser. This communication with Ohio took place.
Crittenden and Cockrell, the attorneys for Congdon, employed by
him for that purpose. opened a correspondence with persons in that
state, ascertained, as required, that Glandner was solvent and
responsible, had the note endorsed by Glandner, returned it to
their client about the 1st of September 1873, who retained it in
his possession without objection, though he did not enter satisfaction of the deed of trust.
In these circumstances the deed must be held as satisfied, and
no longer a subsisting encumbrance at the time plaintiffs applied
for insurance. Oongdon's conduct on this occasion, after what had
passed, must be held tantamount to an admission that he was satisfied with Glandner as an endorser, and that the deed of trust had
served its purpose : 1 Greenl. Ev., sect. 197.
If the note of Ridenour had been paid prior to the last-named
period, no one would doubt the competency of parol evidence to
show that fact. If competent in that case, then competent also in
this. It is always competent to show by verbal evidence that a
written agreement is "totally discharged :" 1 Grenl. on Ev., sect.
302; May on Ins., sect. 290; Hawkes v. Ins. Co., 11 Wis.
188.
Again, the consideration of the deed of trust as expressed on its
face was to secure the note, but the law is well settled in this state
that you may, by verbal testimony, explain or contradict the consideration clause in a deed, such clause only possessing the force of
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a receipt: Fontaine v. Boatmans' &av. Inst., 57 Mo. 561; ifollocher v. Hollocher, 62 Id. 267. No importance is to be attached
to the date of the deed of trust being subsequent to the note.
This is fully explained by the evidence as well as the fact that the
deed of trust, through mistake of the scrivener, was drawn to extend over a longer period of time than that intended by the
parties.
V. The failure of the plaintiffs to furnish formal proofs of loss
cannot avail the defendants, and for these reasons : It would be
most unreasonable that the plaintiffs be held bound to comply with
the condition of a policy, to notify the company forthwith of any
loss, when that company, by its own failure to comply with its contract and issue the promised policy, prevented the plaintiffs from
knowing that condition. If the company would insist upon lack
of complete performance in this particular, this can only be done
when they make complete performance possible, or at least interpose no obstacle in the way of such performance: 56 Penn. St.,
supra.
The company cannot be allowed to say to plaintiffs: " If we had
issued you a policy it would have contained a certain condition,
and as you have not complied with that condition which the policy
we would have issued would have contained, therefore you cannot
recover." This is certainly a most remarkable defence to interpose. Besides, the defendant must be held as having waived the
proofs being furnished by refusing to issue the policy and denying
all responsibility: Tayloo v. Ins. Co., 9 IHow. 390, and cases
cited; il-eComas v. Tns. Co., 56 Mo. 573; May on Ins., sects.
468-9; FranklinFire Ins. Co. v. Coates, 14 Md. 285. It must
be conceded that the formal proofs offered in evidence by plaintiffs
were only evidence of the fact that they were furnished to defendant and no more: NYewmark v. ITns. Co., 30 Mo. 160. But there
was other evidence ,in the cause showing the extent of plaintiffs'
loss.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
NORTON

and RAY, JJ., concurred.

HoUGR and HENRY, JJ.,

dissented.
From the time when contracts of
insurance were first known, it has been
customary to evidence them by a policy,
Upon this general custom, some early

writers formulated a rule, that there
could be no valid and binding insurance
without a policy: 1 Duer on Ins. 60.
In America, this view was taken in a
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few early cases. In Head v. The Povidence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 166 (1804),
MAnSHALL, C. J., maintained that a
charter which empowered a corporation
to make contracts of insurance by policy,
and prescribed the manner in which a
policy must be executed, confined the
company to that method of contracting.
Tile question in that case was upon a
verbal negotiation for the cancellation
of a policy. The Chief Justice declared
that a contract which could not be created
except by writing, could not be otherwise cancelled.
This opinion was approved in Cockerill v. The Cin. Mutual Ins. Co., 16
Ohio 148. The insured had forfeited
his policy by a sale of his interest in the
property. The company verbally agreed
to waive the forfeiture ff he would repurchase. This was done; but the
court decided, upon the general usage
and the implication of the charter, that
the policy had not been legally revived.
The principle of these eases was reaffirmed by the Superior Court of New
York City, in Spitzer v. St. Marks Ins.
Co., 6 Duer 6 (1856), under a misapprehension, however, as to the final
decision of the New York Court of Appeals, in The Baptist Church v. Brooklyn
Fire Ins. Co., infra.
But judicial opinion was by no means
uniform on this subject. In Smith v.
Odlin, 4 Yeates 468 (1807), Chief
Justice TILGHMAN refused, obiter, to
pronounce an oral contract of insurance
invalid. In Sandford v. Trust Fire Ins.
Co., 11 Paige 547 (1845), Chancellor
W.iLWOtTH admitted the possibility of
an oral insurance.
In Alctulloc't v.
The Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 278 (1822),
Chief Justice PAntEit said it was "certain that, if a contract was made, the
mere want of a policy Will not prevent
plaintiff from recovering." But in this
and in the foregoing case, there was no
completed contract.
Finally, in Warren v. Ocean Ins. Co.,
16 MIe. 439 (1840), a waiver of forfeiture, irregularly endorsed by the

company's agent upon the policy, was
declared binding as a parol agreement,
though the usual fee had not been paid.
Since then the validity of a parol insurance has been so frequently and uniformly affirmed, that it may well be
pronounced the undoubted American
doctrine.
The ground taken is, that at common
law, a contract of insurance was not
different from any other. No contract
is required to be in writing unless by
statute. When the agreement to insure
has been made by a company, it is governed by the same rules which prevail
in a transaction with an individual tinderwriter. By prescribing a manner of
executing the policy, the charter does
not exclude the oral engagement, because
the contract and the policy of insurance
are not identical. The leading case for
this view is The Com. Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Union Mutual Ins. Co., 19 How. 318
(1856). That was an oral contract with
a company organized on the mutual plan.
No premium was paid, no premium-note
was given, and the loss occurred before
the policy could be executed.

CunRTis,

J., held that the liability to give a premium-note was equivalent to the actual
execution and delivery of it, and that
the oral contract bound the company.
In the following cases larol contracts
were held obligatory, notwithstanding
the implication of a charter provision
that policies should be binding only when
signed by the president and secretary,
and countersigned by the agent. In
many of these cases it was admitted that
a corporation could disaffirm its most
solemn acts if ultra vires. In some
instances the premium was paid, in
whole or in part, by note or in cash:
Ide v. Pcenix Ins. Co., 2 Biss. 333;
Hamilton v. Lycoming Mutual Ins. Co.,
5 Barr 339 ; Mobile, 6-c., Ins. Co. v.
MicMillan, 31 Ala. 711 ; Blanchard v.
Waite, 28 Me. 51 ; Lightbody v. N. A.
Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 18; Hartford Ins.
Co. v. Farrish, 73 Ill. 166 ; Shaw v.
Rep. Lfe Ins. Co., 67 Barb. 586;

-
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Home Ins. Co. v.

Myer, 93

II.

271.
In other cases no premium was paid:
New Eng., d-c., Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 25
Ind. 536; Dayton Ins. Co. v. Kelly,
24 Ohio St. 345 ; Train v. HollandPurchase Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 598; Northrup
v. Miss. TValley Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 435 ;'
Kelly v. Commonwealth ins. Co., 10
Bosw. 82; West. .lfas3. Ins. Co. v.
Duffey, 2 Kans. 347; Phodes v. Railway Pass. Ins. Co., 5 Lans. 71 ; Weeks
V. Lycoming Ins. Co., 7 Ins. L. J. 552;
Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 52
Miss. 441.
The same principle is recognised in
cases of life insurance : Cooper v. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 7 Nev. 116;
Sheldon v. Conn. Mutual Lffe Ins. Co.,

25 Conn. 207.
The parol contract is effectual, not
only as an original insurance, but also
as a renewal of the policy: Post v.
.zEtna Ins. Co., 43 Barb. 351; and
again, as an extension of the policy to
cover other goods: Kennebec Co. v.
Augusta Ins. 6- Banking Co., 6 Gray
204. It is just as effectual to establish
a retrospective insuranec, as a written
policy: Security Fire 1ns. Co. v. Kentucky 3. 6- F. Ins. Co., 7 Bush 81.
So too a special privilege, as permission
to ship goods on deck instead of in the
vessel's hold, may be granted by parol,
though such permission is required by
the terms of the policy to be endorsed
thereon: NY. W. Iron Co. v. .Etna Ins.
Co., 26 Wis. 78.
Notwithstanding the very explicit
opinion of CuRTis, J., in Com. Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Union Mutual Ins. Co., supra,
later cases have apparently established
an exception in this regard, when the
alleged contract was %iitha mutual
company. It seems necessary for the
insured to pay the premium, deliver the
premium note, and receive or sign the
policy, before the contract is complete.
This is so, because it is said, mutual
companies could not otherwise do busi-

ness. The premium notes are their sole
capital, and the claim' against the insured, to have him execute a note, is
too dangerous and tedious a remedy.
The requirements which they make of
their members are conditions precedent
to any insurance: Belleville illutuai Ins.
CO. v. Van Winkle, 1 Beas. 333 ; Schafl~r
v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 89 Penn. St.
296.
In the leading case of .The Baptist
Chiurch v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 19 N.
Y. 305 (1859), suit was brought upon
an oral contract to renew from year to
year, in consideration of the annual
premium. Prepayment of premium was
waived in same way, and loss occurred'
after expiration of year, and before payment of premium. One of the defences
was that the agreement, because not in
writing, was void by the Statute of
Frauds, as by its terms not to be performed within a year from the making.
The court held, that since performance
was not impossible within a year, the
statute did not apply. To the same
effect is Sanborn v. Fireman's Ins. Co.,
16 Gray 448.
Where a statute requires written contracts of insurance to have a stamp,
without anything further, an oral contract is not for that reason invalid:
Fish v. Cottenet, 44 N. Y. 538.
A statute requiring all the conditions
of the insurance to be inserted in the
.policy, simply prevents other papers
being made a part of the policy by mere
reference, and does not forbid a parol
insurance: Relief Fire Ins. Co. v. Shaw,
4 Otto 574.
A policy is not invalid on the ground
of no insurable interest in a case of loss
before issuance; because the interest
did exist at the time of the parol contract, and the insurance dates from that
time: City of Davenport v. Peoria, 6&c.,
ns. Co., 17 Iowa 276; Am. Horse As.
Co. v. Patterson, 28 Ind. 17.
Although an agent is instructed in all
cases to make out policies which by their
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terms are not to be obligatory until
countersigned by himself, yet he may
bind the company by a preliminary parol
contract; and the circumstance that lie
has in his possession policies executed in
blank by the company, is conclusive evidence that they designed him to exercise this incidental authority : Ellis v.
Albany, 4-c., Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 402;
Post v. .Etna Ins. Co., 43 Barb. 351;
Angell v. Hartford Fre Ins. Co., 59 N.
Y. 171. His authority may also be
settled by custom: Corn. Mutual Mlarino
ins. Co. v. Union Mutual Ins. Co., 19
How. 318.
Of course all the elements of a perfect
contract must be present; unless everything essential is ascertained, there is no
insurance: Sandford v. Trust, 5-c., Ins.
Co., II Paige Ch. 547; Hartford Ins.
Co. v. Wilcox, 57 Ill. 180.
It was said by Judge RonanTso, in
Tyler v. N. A. Ins. Co., 4 Robt. 151,
that there were five essential elements in
every contract of insurance, all of which
must be definitely ascertained to miike a
valid obligation, viz., the subject-matter,
the risk, the amount, the duration, and
the premium. But the cases hardly
justify so rigid a proposition. Frequently one of these elements, when not
settled by the express contract, is supplied by implication. Audubon v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 216, was a case
of this sort. The company had at divers
times insured A. upon certain papers
and plates, portions of a work he was
publishing, while at the binders. On
sending a fresh lot to the binders, A.
applied for a policy, stating risk, amount
and time. A policy was promised, but
no premium was settled. The court
held that, since the risk did not differ in
character or duration from the preceding
arrangements, the same premium was to
be implied. Eanes v. Home Ins. Co., 4
Otto 621, was a parol contract in which
the duration of the risk was not fixed,
and the court assumed that it was intended to endure for one year, accord-*

ing to general custom. Again, where
the amount of the premium was not fixed,
but by agreement was to be deducted,
when settled, from moneys due insured
in the hands of thie company, it was
held that the designation of a fund was
sufficient: W1alker v. Met. Ins. Co.,
56 Me. 37 1. In a case where the fixing
of the premium was postponed till the
agent could inspect the building, the
verbal contract was nevertheless held
complete, and the company was liable
for loss before inspection: Cooke v.
.Etna Ins. Co., 7 Daly 555. When
authority is given to an agent to take out
a policy in some good company, the
premium which the agent in his discretion may settle will bind the applicant:
Train v. Holland Purchase Ins. Co.,
62 N. Y. 598. And conversely where
the agent represents several companies,
and it is left to his discretion where to
place the risk, the exercise of this discretion by entry on his books binds the
company named there, before the issuance of a policy: Ellis v. Albany, 6-c.,
Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 402. When the
negotiation is carried on by mail, the
contract is complete from the time the
insured posts a letter accepting the insurer's proposition ; and a check sent at
that time is a prepayment of premium:
Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 9
How. 390, overruling Ae Culloch v.
Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 278.
Merely handing in an application subject to the approval of the company, is
not equivalent to an agreement to insure.
Thie company, where it has not unreasonably delayed its decision, may reject the
application after loss. And it is not
bound to return the premium at the same
time, unless demand is made: Harp v.
Grangers, 6-c., Ins. Co., 49 Md. 307 ;
Alabama, 6-c., Ins. Co. v. Hllayes, 61
Ala. 163; Barrv. N. A. Ins. Co., 61
Ind. 488. And the applicant may withdraw his proposal any time before
acceptance: Globe, 4-c., Ins. Co. v. Snell,
19 Hun 560. But where the aggent
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takes the premium and declares the
applicant insured upon the oral contract,
but no policy is to issue till the company's special agent has inspected the
building, the company has by this arrangement merely the right to terminate
the contract, if upon inspection its agent
disapproves the risk. In the meantime,
the applicant is insurcd Putnam v.
Home Ins. Co., 123 Mass. 324.
Where the policy is mai.e out, but is
not accepted and premium paid within
a reasonable time, the company may
consider the contract at an end: Baxter
Y. Massasoit Ins. Co., 13 Allen 320.
Where the company has a rule of
which the applicant has notice, that no
insurance is complete until a written
acceptance of the terms is filed with the
company, or until premium has been
paid, there is no contract till this is done:
Flint v. Ohio Ins. Co., 8 Ohio 501;
Markey v. The Ins. Co., 126 Mass. 158.
But where the agent of the company
agrees to issue a policy, and tells the
applicant that he may consider himself
insured, the contract is complete without
prepayment of premium, nlthough the
policy when issued will contain a provision that it shall not be binding until
premium is paid : Kelly v. Cbmmonwealt
Ins. Co., 10 Bosw. 82.
It has sometimes been said that there
is a distinction between contracts of
insurance and contracts to insure. The
parol agreement is the contract to insure ;
and the executed policy is the contract
of insurance. The distinction, however,
is almost without theoretical or practical
value. The elements of the contract,
the rights and liabilities of the parties,
are substantially the same in both instances. The oral agreement is just as
much a contract of insurance as a written policy. Apparently the real ratio
decidendi, in all the cases where this distinction has been alluded to, is that,
although the chatter of a company or a
statute may prescribe a way in which policies are to be executed, this does not ne-

cessarily exclude oral agreements: Commercial Ins. Co. v. Union, 4-c., Ins.
Co., 19 How. 318; Ins. Co. v. Colt, 20
Wall. 560.
Consequently, in those states and
countries, for example, Georgia, England and some of the continental countries, where by statute contracts of insurance must be in writing, neither party
is bound by a verbal agreement; no
recovery can be had against the company
in case of loss; and the applicant may
withdraw his proposal any time before
receiving his policy: Simonton v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 51 Ga. 76; Croghan v.
N. Y. Underwriters' Agency, 53 Id.
109; Clark v. Brand, 62 Id. 23 ; Xenos
v. Wickham, Law Rep., 2 H. L. 296,
314; Ma wick v. Slade, 3 Camp. 127 ;
Parryv. The Great Ship Co., 4 B. & S.
556.
Where the policy is executed but not
delivered, the contract of insurance is
Upon loss trover may be
complete.
brought for the policy, and the full
indemnity recovered: JKohne v. Ins. Co.
of North America, 1 Wash. 0. C. 93.
If the policy has not been executed,
the insured has his election ; he may proceed at law upon the parol contract, or
lie may bring a bill in equity for specific
performance of the agreement to issue a
policy. And the latter seems the better
method ; since equity, to prevent circuity
of action, having jurisdiction of the case
will determine the whole matter, and
make a decree for the payment of the
actual loss: lValker v. _Met. Ins. Co.,
56 Y.e. 371 ; Commercial, 6-c., Ins.
Co. v. Union, 6-c., Ins. Co., 19 How.
318 ; Ilrooddy v. Old Dominion Ins. Co.,
Iron Co. v.
31 Grattan 362; N. I.
.,Etna Ins. Co., 26 '"is. 78; Security
Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenty, 6-c., Ins. Co.,
7 Bush 81.
Where the ground of claim is an oral
renewal, an action will lie on the policy:
Post v. lEtna Ins. Co., 43 Barb. 351.
Where the policy should, by its terms,
be executed by the president and secre-
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tary, and in fact is not, but is count rsigned by the agent, suit should be
brought on the parol agreement and not
on the policy : Peoria Ins. Co. v. Malser,
22 Ind. 73.
By the law of Canada, the insured
cannot sue at law directly for the amount
of the loss upon a parol contract; his
only remedy is in equity, or, perhaps, an
action at law for the delivery of the
policy: Jones v. Pro. Ins. Co., 16
Up. Can. Q. B. 477.
If the policy when issued does not
conform to the verbal agreement, there
is no merger, unless under circumstances
which amount to an acceptance of the
policy with notice of the variance:

Humphrl v. Hartfor? Fire Ins. Co., 15
Blatchf. 504; Franklin Ins. Co. v.
Hewitt, 3 B. Mon. 231. And where
the variance has occurred through the
error of the company, equity will rectify
the mistake and award full damages for
the loss : Home Ins. Co. v. Myer, 93 Ill.
271. A court of admiralty, however,
will not reform a policy of insurance.
That court has ho jurisdiction of the
preliminary contract, out only of the
perfect instrument; just as it has no
jurisdiction over the contract to build a
ship, though it 'has over the ship when
built: Andrews v. Essex .ire J- Marine
Ins. Co., 3 'Mason 6.
DWIGHT M. LownaY.

Supreme Court of California.
PRATT v. WHITTIER,

ET AL.

As between the vendor and vendee, the rule for determining what is a fixture is
always construed strongly against the vendor.
Chattels attached to the freehold by the owner, and contributing to its value and
enjoyment, pass by a grant of the freehold if the grantor has power to convey.
Parties may by express agreement fix upon chattels annexed to the realty whatever character they choose. Property which the law regards as fixtures may be by
them considered" as personalty, and vice versa: and such agreements will be enforced
by the courts.
Plaintiff by deed granted to defendant the Orleans Hotel, describing ii as "Lot
No. 6, in the square between J and K and Front and Second streets, in the city
of Sacramento, and the appurtenances and improvements thereunto belonging."
Plaintiff reserved in his deed the right to remove from the upper rooms of the hotel
his "-furniture, carpets and pictures, but none of the permanent fixtures or appurtenances to said property shall be removed."
Held, that the plaintiff was not
entitled to remove the gas fixtures, consisting of chandeliers ; globes leitered " Orleans
Hotel ;" brackets, burners, pendants, &c. ; a kitchen-range with boilers attached,
the range resting on a brick foundation and with its attachments connected to the
building by pipes; tanks and filters attached to the building by a system of pipes,
nor mosquito-transoms and window-screens fitted to the windows and transoms of
the hotel in the usual manner, as such articles were fixtures which passed by the deed
to defendant as being essential for the purposes for which the building was formerly
used. The plaintiff having reserved in his deed only the furniture, pictures and
carpets of the upper rooms of the building, and none of the " permanent fixtures or
appurtenances to the property," it must be presumed that the parties by their agreement considered the things in controversy as permanent fixtures an.l annurtenances
of the hotel which were to pass by the deed.
VoL. XXX.-7
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McParland. -Edgerton,for appellant.
Freeman &' Bates, for respondents.
McKE, J.-This was an action to recover certain gas fixtures,
consisting of chandeliers, globes, brackets, burners, pendants, &c.,
a kitchen-range with boiler attached, a patent water-filter, tanks
and mosquito-screens. The property was attached to a building
known as the "Orleans Hotel," situate on a lot of land fronting
on Second street, in the city of Sacramento.
As owner of the hotel, the plaintiff on October 15th 1879, contracted in writing to sell the same to the defendant, by the following
description, viz.:
"Lot No. 6 in the square between J and K and Front and
Second streets, in the city of Sacramento, and the appurtenances
and improvements thereunto belonging." The sale was made for
$28,OOQ gold coin, payable after an examination and approval of
the title, upon receiving from the plaintiff possession of the property
and of a deed of grant of the same, on or before the first day of
November 1879, reserving to the plaintiff, among other things,
the right, within ten days after delivery of possession, to remove
from the upper rooms of the hotel "his furniture, carpets and
pictures, but none of the permanent fixtures or appurtenances to
said property shall be removed." On the 26th of October, the
defendants, having satisfied themselves about the plaintiff's title,
paid the full amount of the purchase-money and received from the
plaintiff possession and a deed of grant of the property. The
deed described the property the same way that it had been described in the contract of sale, and it also contained the recital that
the deed bad been made in pursuance of the contract of sale, and
subject to the terms, conditions and reservations therein contained.
Within ten days after the delivery of possession plaintiff demanded of the defendants the privilege of removing the articles in
controversy from the hotel, which, being refused, this action was
instituted, and the question arises whether the articles are personalty, or Ujxtures which passed as appurtenances of the realty by
the deed of grant.
If the question arose out of the deed alone it might not be
difficult of solution, for the weight of authority seems to be in
favor of the proposition that they are to be regarded as movable
property, capable oF being severed from the building; yet the
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authorities upon the subject are conflicting. In i1fcKeag v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 38, the Supreme Court of New York
held that gas pipes which run through the walls and under the
floors of a house are permanent parts of the building; but fixtures
attached to such pipes, where they are simply screwed on projections of the pipes from the walls, which can be detached by
unscre.wing them, are not appurtenances, and so do not pass by
deed or under a mortgage of the premises, and the mere, declaration of the owner that he intends that such articles shall go with
the house does not make them realty.
In Gutirie v. Jones, 108 Mass. 193, it was held that, as between
landlord and tenant, gas fixtures, though fastened to the walls,
were not annexed to the realty so as to become part of it. They
are, says the court, in their nature, articles of furniture, and the
fact that they were fastened to the walls for safety or convenience
does not deprive them of their character as personal chattels and
make them a part of the realty.
In Fauglen v. Haldeman, 33 Penin. St. 522, the court says:
"Lamps, chandeliers, candlesticks, candelabras, screens and the
various contrivances for lighting houses by means of candles, oil
or other fluids, have never been considered as fixtures and as forming a part of the freehold. There is no trace of a contrary doctrine in the English decisions, nor does it appear that the ordinary
apparatus for lighting has ever been classed among fixtures. In
Jarechi v. PhilharmonicSociety, 79 Penn. St. 403, and 21 Am.
Rep. 78, the case of VFaughen v. Haldeman was reviewed and
approved.

Says SHARSWOOD, J.-"Houses are considered as

finished by the builders when the gas fittings are completed. The
fixtures are put up in more or less expensive style, according to
the tastes and means of the persons who mean to occupy them,
whether as tenants or owners. If the tenant puts them in, it is
not denied that, as between him and the landlord, they are his,
and he may remove them or they may be sold as personal property
on an execution by the sheriff. No doubt the owner, if they
belong to him, often sells them with the house. They add more
to the value of the house than they would be worth if removed.
But if there is no agreement to sell the house as it is-fixtures
and all-the purchaser is not entitled to them. We see then no
reason for departing from the judgment in Vauqhen v. ialdeman." To the same effect are Shaw v. Lenke, 1 Daly 487;
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2Jontague v. Dent, 10 Rich. 138; Bogers v. Crow, 40 Mo. 91;
Lawrence v. KYemp, I Duer 363; Towne v. Fiske, 127 Mass. 125..
On the other hand, it has been held by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, in the case of Johnson v. Wiseman, 4 Met. 357, that
where a vendee of a house in possession purchased and put into it
gas fixtures, chandeliers. &c., which were affixed by means of
screws to iron pipes let into the walls of the house for the purpose
of conducting gas to the burners, such chandeliers, &c., became
fixtures which passed by a deed of the realty, in the absence of
any express provision to the contrary, although they may be
removable without injury to the walls or the ceiling of the house,
or to the pipes to which they are attache.
The same doctrine
was enunciated in Smith v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush 31, as one
about which there was no question. Whatever, indeed, is accessory
to a building for the more convenient use and improvement of the
building is considered to pass by a deed of the premises. Thus
articles placed in a mill by the owner to carry out the obvious
purpose for which it was erected are generally part of the realty,
notwithstanding the fact that they could be removed and used
elsewhere: Parsons v. Copeland, 38 Me. 537. In a building
erected as a factory, the steam works relied on to furnish the
motive power, and the works to be driven by it, are essential parts
of the factory, adapted to be used with it, and would pass by a
conveyance of the real estate: 4 Met. 306. Apparatus for the
manufacture of gas are fixtures: Hays v. Doane, 3 Stock. 84.
Gas burners are of the same character. They are in no sense
furniture, but are mere accessories to the building: Keeler v.
Keeler, 31 N. J. Eq. 191.
What is accessory to real estate is, according to the rule of the
common law, part of it, and passes with it by alienation. That
rule has been, in the growth of the law, greatly modified as
between landlord and tenant, for the encouragement of trade,
manufacture, agriculture and domestic convenience; and courts
recognise and enforce the right of removal by a tenant of chattels
annexed to the freehold for such purposes. But the rule which is
applicable to persons in that relation, does not apply as between
heir and executor, vendor and vendee. As between the latter the
rule of the common law is still applicable, except so far as it may
be modified by statutory regulations upon the subject. So that
chattels attached to the freehold by the owner, and contributing to
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its Value and enjoyment, pass by the grant of the freehold, if the
grantor had power to convey, Tourtellot v. Phelps, 4 Gray 378,
and after conveyance they cannot be severed by the vendor or any
one else than the owner.
As between vendor and vendee, therefore, the rule for determining what is a fixture is always construed strongly against the
seller. Many things pass by a deed of a house, being put there
by the owner and seller, which a tenant who had put them there
might have removed; and they will be regarded as fixtures, which
pass to the vendee, although annexed and used for purposes of
trade, manufacture, or for ornament or domestic use. Thus,
potash kettles appertaining to a building for manufacturing ashes
(JIfiller v. Plumb, 6 Cowen 665); a cotton-gin fixed in its place
(Bratton v. 0lawson, 2 Strob. 478); a steam engine to' drive a bark
mill (Oves v. Oglesby, 7 Watts 106); kettles set ir brick* in dyeing
and print works (Despateh Line of Packets v. Bellamy Han. Co.,
12 N. I. 207); iron stoves fixed to the brick work of chimneys
(Goddard v. chase, 7 Mass. 432); wainscot work, fixed and
dormant tables, engines and boilers used in a flour mill and
attached to it (Sand v. Pfeiffer, 10 Cal. 259); a steam-engine
and boiler fastened to a frame of timber, and bedded in a quartz
ledge, and used for the purpose of working the ledge (Mllerritt v.
Judd, 14 Cal. 59); i conduit of water-pipe to conduct water to a
house (Philbrick v. Emry, 97 Mass. 134); hop-poles in use on a
hop-farm (Bishop v. Bishop, 11 N. Y. 123); statues erected for
ornament, though only kept in place by their own weight (Snedeker
v. Warring, 2 Kern. 170). In fact, whatever the vendor has
annexed to a building, for the more convenient use and improvement of the premises passes by his deed. The true rule deduced
from all the authorities, say the Supreme Court of Virginia, seems
to be this: That when the machinery is permanent in its character,
and essential to the purpose for which the building is occupied, it
must be regarded as realty, and passes with the building; and that
whatever is essential for the purposes for which the building is used
will be considered as a fixture, although the connection between
them may be such that it may be severed without physical or lasting injury t&either: G-reen v. Phillips, 26 Gratt. 752; Shelton v.
_icklin, 32 Id. 735.
Judged by these rules, it would seem as if there was no room
for doubt as to the character of the articles in controversy. Taking
into consideration their nature, the circumstances under which they
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were placed in the building, the mode of their connection with it,
and the relation which they bear to its use and enjoyment, they
must be regarded as essential for the purposes for which the building was used. The plaintiff himself, by his testimony, shows that
the globes were lettered " Orleans Hotel," and that they, with the
chandeliers, &c, were necessary for furnishing light to the building; that the range rested on a foundation of brick, and that it
and its attachments were annexed to the building by pipes, which
connected them with the tanks and filters on the roof of the building, and by a waste-pipe which ran through the wall of the
building and connected with a sewer in an alley outside, and that
the range and its attachments were necessary for cooking; that the
tanks and filters were attached to the building by a system of
pipes which connected them with the main or pipes of the City
Water Company, and with various parts of the hotel, and were
necessary to supply the hotel with clear water; that the mosquitotransoms and window-screens were fitted to the windows and transoms of the hotel-each window and transom-frame being fitted
to its particular window, and shoved up and down in it on grooves,
and all of them were as necessary to the hotel as its windows, its
blinds and shutters. All of the articles were therefore essential
to the use and enjoyment of the hotel; in fact, as the plaintiff testified, "it would not have been a hotel without them." They were,
therefore, fixtures which passed by the deed of grant to the defendant, unless they were specially reserved by the deed. But the
deed reserved none of the articles. It was made, according to its
recitals, in pursuance of the agreement of the 15th of October, and
subject to the terms, conditions and reservations therein contained
and expressed.
As already stated, the agreement reserved only the furniture,
pictures and carpets of the upper rooms of the building, and none
of the "permanent fixtures or appurtenances to the property."
In the absence froM the deed of any special reservation of the
articles, it must be presumed that the parties, b-v their agreement,
considered them as permanent fixtures and appurtenances of the
hotel which were to pass by the deed. It is a well-settled rule of
law that parties themselves may, by express agreement, fix upon
chattels annexed to realty whatever character they may have agreed
upon. Property which the law regards as fixtures may be by them
considered as personalty, and that which is considered in law as
personalty they may regard as a fixture. Whatever may be their
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agreement, courts will enforce it: ,Smith v. Waggoner, 50 Wis.
155- 97 Mass. 279 ; 20 N. Y. 344; 53 Id. 377 ; 24 Wend. 359;
1 Hill 176 ; 52 N. Y. 146.
So that the plaintiff, when he contracted to sell the hotel property with its appurtenances and improvements, reserving from
the sale only the carpets, furniture and pictures of the upper
rooms of the building, fixed upon all the chattels which he had
annexed, to the hotel, and which were necessary to its use and
enjoyment, the character of appurtenances and improvements of
the hotel. None of them, by any possibility of construction, could
fall within the reservation of "furniture, carpets or pictures in the
upper rooms of the hotel."
The plaintiff, therefore, sold the articles in question as fixtures
with the hotel, and as such they passed by his subsequent deed
of the premises to the defendants.
Judgment and order affirmed.
As between landlord and tenant gas
fixtures, so called, consisting of gas
chandeliers, burners, &e., screwed upon
the gas pipe in the usual way, have
always been considered as the property
of the tenant and removable by him.
See Lawrence v. Kemp, I Duer 363
Ex parte Morrow, I Lowell's Dec. 386;
s. a., 2 N. B. R. (2d ed.) 665; Guthie V. Jones, 108 21ass. 191 ; Seeger v.
Pettit, 77 Penn. St. 437 ; Hays v Doane,
11 N. J. Eq. 84.
As between vendor and vendee, and
mortgagor and mortgagee, the weight
of authority in the United States seems
to be, as stated in the principal case,
that where the question is not affected
by the terms of the contract between the
parties, they are regarded as furniture
and do not pass with the land; Montuque v. Dent, 10 Rich. Law 135, where
it was so held as between the purchaser
at a mortgage sale and an execution
creditor.
Faughen v. Haldeman, 33
Penn. St. 522; .oarechi v. Philharnonic
Society, 79 Penn. St. 403; Rogers v.
Crow, 40 Mo. 91; Shaw v. Lenke, I
Daly 487 ; McKeage v. Hanover F. fins.
Co., 81 N. Y. 38: Towne v. Fiske, 127

Mass. 125 ; see, also, Lawrence v. Kemp,
1 Duer 363; Steuar v. Douglas, 1870,

Brown'

Fixt., Appendix A.;

Runk v.

Brigaldi, 4 Daly 359. See, however,
contra, Johnson v. Wiseman, 4 Met. (Ky.)
357; Sewell v. Angerstein, 18 L. T. (N.
S.) 300, at Nisi Prius per WILLES, J.,
the judges of the Court of C. P. agreeing with him; Ex parte Acton, 4 L. T.
(N. S.) 261 ; .Exparte W1ilson, 2 Mont.
& Ayr, 71 ; Smith v. Commonwealth, 14
Bush 31 ; see, also, Ex parte 11orrow, 1
Low. Dec. 386 ; s. c. 2 N. B. R. (2d
ed.) 665. In Ex parte Acton, and Bx
parte Wilson, supro, the gas burners
were accessory to a mill and the cases
may probably be distinguished on that
acount.
Gas fittings (i. e. the pipes to which
the gas fixtures are attached) as distinguished from gas fixtures, do, however, pass with the land where there is
nothing in the deed to indicate a contrary intention. Ackroyd v. Mitchell, 3
L. T. (N. S') 236; Exparte Acton, 4 L.
T. (N. S.) 261; -x parte Wilson, 2
Mont. & Ayr 61; felieag v. Hanover
F. Ins. Co. 81 N. Y. 38. So, also, as it
seems, is to gasometers and apparatus
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for generating gas; Hays v. Doane, 11
N. J. Eq. 96.
Gas fixtures may also pass with the
land, where it is apparent from the dced
that such was the intention of the parties, and this appears to be the real
ground of the decision in tie principal
case; and upon this ground the decision
seems correct.
The kitchen range and boilers, and
the tanks and filters, would seem clearly
to come within tile same rule applied to
the gas fixtures. Stoves set up in the
usual way are, however, in the absence
of terms in the deed affecting ie question, generally considered as furniture,
and hence do not pass wits the land;
Williams v. Bailey, Sup. Ct. Mass.,
Essex, April 1801, 3 Dane's Abr. 152,
sect. 25; Freeland v. Southworth, 24
Wend. 191: Harris v. Haynes, 34 Vt.
220 ; see, also, Tuttle v. Pobinson, 33
v.
N. H. 104. See, however,
CGause, 7 Mass. 432; Smith v. Heiskell,
I Cranch C. 0. 99; Blethen v. Towle, 19
Me. 252. See, also, Folsom v. Nlloore,
Id. 252; Tuttle v. Robinson, supra. In
the above cases, ie stoves held to pass
with the land were probably more or
less securely annexed to the house.
As to hot-air furnaces, there is some
In
conflict among the authorities.
Towne v. F-ske, 127 Mass. 125, a portable hot-air furnace, resting by its own
weight upon the ground, put into a house
by a person rightfully in possession under an agreement for a deel (in which
case the same rule prevails, as between
grantor and grantee: McLaughlin v.
Nash, 14 Allen 136; Hemeanway v. Cutter, 51 Mle. 407 ; Ogden v. Stock, 34Ill.
522; Christian v. Dripps, 2; Penn. St.
271 ; Perkinsv. Swanke, 43 Miss. 349;
Ewell on Fixt. 272), was held not to
become a part of the realty, although
connected with the house by a cold-air
box, and hot-air pipes and registers in
the usual manner.
On the other hand in Stock-well v.
gamp ell, 39 Conn. 362, a portable hot-

air furnace, placed by the owner of the
freehold in a pit prepared fbr it in the
cellar of the house, but not set in brick,
or otherwise fastened to the house or
floor, but held in its place by its own
weight, together with the smoke-pipe
leading therefrom to the chimney, al
capable of removal without injury to
themselves or the house, but intended as
a permanent annexation, as appeared
from the pit in the cellar, adapted to its
size and depth, were held to be a part of
the realty, rendering the whole house
subject to a mechanic's lien, for the
value thereof and the labor of setting
them in the house. In M11ain v. ,Schwarzwadder, 4 E. D. Smith 273, the hot-air
furnace which was held to pass with the
house, was so connected with the house
by the owner, that to remove it, it would
be necessary to take down brick-work
adjoining it, and its removal would probably cause the ceiling to fall. Where
the connection between a furnace put
into a house by the owner of' the house,
is so intimate as in this case, or, as in
Steekwell v. Campbell, it is so annexed
as to appear to have been intended as a
permanent annexation to the house, the
better opinion would seem to be that it
should be regarded as passing with the
house, and not as furniture or mere personal property. Ir point of fact, such
furnaces are believed to be generally
considered as permanent accessions to
the houses containing them, and not'to
be subject to removal as are ordinary
stoves; and hence the case of Towne v.
FRske would seem open to criticism upon
this point.
As to the screen windows and transoms
there would seem to be no doubt as to
the correctness of the decision in the
principal case ; and those articles would
doubtless have been considered as fixtures passing with the house in the absence of words in the deed affecting the
question. Having been made for, fitted
to, and used with the house, they would
seem to be as much a part of the house
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as ordinary doors or windows. See Pet- is complete without them, they will not
tengdl v. Bvans, 5 N. H. 54; Mtow's pass by the conveyance of the house,
Case, 14 H. 8 25, pl. 6; L#ord's Case, though they may be secreted in the
14 Vin. Abr. 3193; 11 Co. 85 ; Shep. house*: Peclz v. Batchelder, 40 Vt. 233.
On the whole the decision in the prinTouch. 90; State v. Elliot, 11 N. H.
540 ; Johnston v. Dobie, Lior. Diet. 5443. cipal case seems satisfactory, and in
Where, however, double windows or accordance with established principles.
MmtsuAL D. Ew.nLL.
blinds have never been actually or conChicago.
structively annexed to the house, which

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
W. H. CHERRY v. JOHN P. FROST ET AL.
An assignment for value, in due course of trade, of a certificate in a corporation
with a blank power of attorney to transfer the stock in the books of the company
passes the whole title legal and equitable.
If the pledgee of a certificate of stock so assigned as collateral security, subpledges the certificate for money loaned to him in ignorance of the owner's equity,
the sub-pledgee will be entitled to hold the stock, as against the owner, to the
extent of the consideration. Where a note is given for money borrowed at the time,
secured by stock pledged as collateral, and the note is renewed at maturity, upon an
extension of time, and the new note secured by a pledge of the same, or other stocks
assigned with power of attorney to transfer, the payee who receives them without
notice of any outstanding equity, takes them in due course of trade free from such
equity.
If the holders of a note, secured by stock as collaterals, after the contract has
been closed, exchange any of the collaterals with the makers of the notes for other
stocks of equal value, he would take the latter as security for a pre-existing debt,
but would be a purchaser of them to the extent of the consideration given in
exchange.
At the time a certificate of stock was wrongfully sub-pledged, only a part of the
stock was paid up, the corporation then holding the note of the stockholder for the
payment on
residue payable on call, and the stockholders afterwards made
the stock, and gave a negotiable note on the residue, Held, that the sub-pledgee
could only claim, as against the owner, the proportion of the stock paid up at the
time he received the certificate.

NINovember 1871, the complainant Oherry borrowed fiom the
City Bank of Memphis $1000, for which he gave his note, due on
demand, and at the same time deposited with the bank, as collateral
security, a certificate of forty shares, of $100 each, of the capital
stock of the Mississippi Valley Insurance Company. The certificate was, by its face, "transferable in person or by attorney on
surrender of this certificate." On the back of the certificate was
an assignment for value and the printed form of a power of attor-.
VOL. =X.-8
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ney to make the transfer on the books of the company, left blank
as to the name of thn attorney and signed by complainant.
In June 1872, complainant executed to the City Bank of Memphis his note, at ninety days, for $1000, another sum of money
that day borrowed by him, and to secure its payment delivered to
the bank, as collateral security, with a similar endorsement and
blank power of attorney as above, a certificate of thirty shares, of
$100 each, in the capital stock of the Merchants' National Bank.
The certificate was in the form of the certificate as above.
In July 1872, the City Bank suspended payments, and proved
to be utterly insolvent. Upon inquiry the complainant learned
that the certificates of stock, deposited as collateral security for the
payment of his notes, were claimed by defendant Frost, as having
been pledged to him to secure money borrowed from him by the
City Bank. Complainant offered to pay the amount of his two
notes upon surrender of his certificates, which offer was refused by
the defendant Frost. Complainant, then, on the 1st of August
1872, notified the MTssissippi Valley Insurance Company and the
Merchants' National Bank not to assign the stock on their books,
no assignment having yet been made under the power, and on the
9th of August 1872, lie commenced this suit to enjoin the transferree and to assert his rights.
The answer of Frost was that, in May 1872, he loaned to the
City Bank $12,000, fbr which the bank executed to him two notes
of that date, one for $4000, at sixty days, and the other for
$8000, at ninety days, and at the same time delivered to him
various collaterals, and among others the two certificates deposited
by the complainant with the City Bank to secure his notes as
above; that defendant received these collaterals under these circumstances, without any notice of the complainant's equity, and
under the full belikf that they were the property of the bank ; that
the collaterals received from the bank were insufficient to pay the
debt of the bank to him.
On final hearing the chancellor dismissed the bill, whereupon
complainant appealed
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOPER, J.-The complainant insists that the defendant is not
a bonacide purchaser for value and without notice. He bases his
contention first, on the character of the transaction between the
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defendant and the bank, and secondly, upon the character of the
certificate. It does satisfactorily appear that no money was actually
loaned by the defendant to the bank on the 10th of May 1872.
About $3000 of the consideration of the notes of the bank
executed on this day had been loaned by the defendant to the bank
May 17th 1871. On January 10th 1872 a new note was given
by the bank for the amount at four months. On the same day the
bank borrowed from Frost the additional sum of a5000, giving its
note therefor, at four months. On 20th of February 1872, the
bank borrowed from Frost the additional sum of $4000, and gave
its note therefor. On the 10th of May 1872, these notes were
renewed by the two notes for $8000 and $4000, for the security
of which the defendants claim that the collaterals in controversy
were given.
It is first insisted by the complainant, upon this state of facts,
that even if it be conceded that certificates of stock are of that
character of security which pass to a bonafide purchaser for value,
free from the equities of third persons, the defendants only
received these certificates. as security for a pre-existing debt, and
not for a consideration passing at the time. The defendant undertakes to meet this argument by saying in his answer and deposition
that each of these transactions was a new one, the previous note
paid and the new note or notes therefore existing for the new
consideration passing. The deposition of the president of the
bank, with whom the transaction was made, is not taken, and
perhaps in the absence of any positive testimony to the contrary,
the defendant's testimony must be allowed to prevail. The substance of what was done, however, whether the form of passing
and repassing checks was actually adopted or not, was a new transaction. A note taken up by a note given to renew it is, in
general, extinguished: Hill v. Bosticek, 10 Yerg. 410. A person
who gives his money, goods or credit for a note at the time of
receiving it, or who then, on account of it, sustained loss or
incurred liability, is a holder in the due course of commercial
transactions: Hinbro v. 1_'t7e, 10 Yerg. 417. And the fact that a
security has been transferred, under such circumstances, in fraud
of a third person, will not affect the holder's right, if entitled to
the character of a 5onafide holder in due course of trade: Nichol
v. Bate, 10 Yerg. 429. The defendant, 'at each renewal by the
bank of its notes, parted with the previous note, which was extin-
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guished; and received the new note upon the extension of the time
of payment with the same or other collaterals. It is not like the.
receipt of collaterals upon an old note which continues to exist,
and is not based on the consideration of the collaterals. In the
one case the collaterals may be surrendered to the rightful
owner, leaving the debt and the consideration of the debt un-

affected. In the other case, the collaterals cannot be taken without depriving the creditor of a part of the consideration of his
contract. It is to the former class of cases that the rule invoked
by the complainant applies, not to the latter: Craigheadv. Iells,
8 Baxt. 38.
It is next insisted in this connection that the certificate of stock
in the Merchants' Bank was not received by the defendant on the
10th of May 1872, because this certificate was not deposited by
the complainant with the bank until the 19th of June 1872, when
he executed his second note for $1000. "
The weight of testimony is in favor of the complainant on this
contention. The complainant swears positively to the fact that
he did give the certificate at that time as collateral security for
the note then executed. The defendant, while certain of the
receipt of the other certificate on the 10th of May 1872, and
probably before that time, is not sure as to the other.
He concedes, moreover, that he was in the habit of sometimes
exchanging with the bank securities received by him as collaterals
for securities of equal value.
There is very little doubt that the certificate in question was
thus received, and not on the 10th of May 1872, when the notes
of the bank were executed. The certificate, in that view, would
be received as security for a pre-existing debt, but for a consideration then passing, namely, the surrender of other securities
of equal value. The party would be a purchaser to the extent of
this consideration. The question would, therefore, be whether the
person who buys from another a certificate of stock, transferred
with a blank power of attorney, is entitled to hold that stock as
against the true owner. This leads us to the second branch of
the case-the character of a certificate so endorsed and the right
of a bona fide purchaser for value.
Stock in a corporation, in the sense of the interest of the stockholders, is a species of incorporeal personal property in the nature
of a chose in action. A certificate of stock is only written evi-
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dence of the ownership of the shares of stock named therein, and
is not negotiable. Although, by the by-laws of a corporation, shares
of the stock may only be transferable upon the books of the company, an equitable right in them may be acquired by a delivery
of the certificate, or by a written assignment or contract, which
will be good between the parties, and may be perfected as against
the corporation and third parties by notice of the assignment or
contract. The effect of a lelivery of the certificate with an assignment and a blank power of attorney on the back thereof has been
a mooted point. It came before this court in Cornick v. Bichards,
3 Lea 1, where the contest was between the holder of a 6ertificate so
assigned as collateral security and other creditors of the assignor.
Two of the judges, MCFARLAND and COOPER, were of opinion that
a complete legal title to stock could only be acquired by a transfer
on the books of the company; that an assignment of a certificate
of stock with a blank ,power of attorney to make the transfer on
the books did not give a cdmplete legal title, but only an equity,
good between the parties, and which might be made good against
the corporation and against the creditors and assignees of the
assignor by notice to the corporation. The other three judges
held that the assignment of the certificate with a blank power of
attorney signed by the assignor, either by way of sale or as collateral security, would pass the title to the assignee as against
the creditors of the assignor without any transfer upon the books
of the company or notice to the corporation. The decision did
not go any further, for it- was not demanded by the facts of the
case. And Judge FREEMAN, in delivering the opinion of the
majority of the court, said: " It is proper to add that, as a matter
of course, we do not hold these certificates negotiable, or that any
of the incidents of such character goes with them by the assignment, so that the assignee must take, subject to previous equities,
as any other assignee standing in the shoes of the assignor."
The case now before us raises the very question suggested in
the latter' clause of the sentence quoted. A pledgee of stock has
clearly no right, either by absolute sale or sub-pledge, to convey
any greater interest than he himself has in the stock pledged:
Talty v. Freedmen's Saving & Trust Co., 93 U. S. 321. The
equity of the pledgor is to redeem his stock by the payment of
the debt secured, and that equity would prevail against the equity
of any assignee standing in the shoes of the assignor.
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The question is therefore squarely raised in this case whether
a sub-pledgee of a certificate of stock transferred with a blank
power of attorney can occupy a better position than his pledgor.
In the view taken by the minority of the court in Cornick v.
Richards, and still entertained by them, the assignment of the
certificate in that form only passed the equitable title, and any
subsequent assignee would, under well-settled law, take subject to
the prior equity. In the view of theomajority of the court, such
an assignment passed the legal title, and, logically, the subsequent
assignee would also have the legal title, which, coupled with the
equity arising from the consideration of the sale or pledge, would
prevail over the prior equity.
The weight of authority in those states which have adopted the
rule that the assignment of a certificate of stock with a blank
power of attorney to transfer passes the whole title, legal and
equitable, undoubtedly is that a sub-assignee, by sale or pledge,
may acquire a better right than his assignor. The reason is that
the owner has passed the legal title with an unlimited power of
disposition, and cannot set up an unknown equity against a title
acquired thereunder in good faith for a valuable consideration
and in due course of trade. It is conceded that the delivery of a
chattel or chose to another in pledge is insufficient to preclude the
real owner from asserting his own rights in case of an unauthorized
disposition of it by the pledgee; but, it is said, "if the owner
intrusts to another not merely the possession of the property, but
also written evidence, over his own signature, of title thereto, and
of unconditional power of disposition over it, the case is vastly
different :" Mc-ceil v. Tenth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 325. The
owner is estopped to dispute the title which he has apparently
conferred: Wood v. Smith, 37 Leg. Int. 315; Cushman v. Thayer
Man. Co., 76 N. Y. 365; Prallv. Tilt, 28 N. J. Eq. 483. And
the owner may always prevent this result by specifying in his
transfer that it is made as collateral security. Upon a reconsideration of the question, the majority of the court adopt these conclusions as the necessary result of the principle settled in Cornick
v. Ric ards, and consider the suggestion in the opinion in that
case, that the assignee must take subject to previous equities, as
an inadvertent dictum. The defendant Frost is therefore entitled
to hold the stock in controversy for the satisfaction of his debt.
But the proof shows that on the 10th of TMay 1872, when the
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defendant took the Mississippi Valley Insurance Company's certificates of stock, the complainant had paid only forty per cent.
of the stock, and the defendant is only a purchaser in due course
of trade to the extent of its then value. The subsequent payment
on and change of the form of complainant's stock into a negotiable
note still unpaid, no matter what may have been the intention
with which the change was made, would not increase the defendant's interest.
With this modification, the decree below will be affirmed.
Itis proposed to consider some of
the questions arising out of the second
branch of tim above case, namely, the
character of a certificate of stock, accompanied by a bill of sale and power,
in the bands of a bona fide purchaser for
value, the stock remaining untransferred
upon the books of the company.
The first point worthy of attention, is
the nature of the title of a bona fide
purchaser of stock while that stock remains in the vendor's name upon the
books of the corporation.
This is a question of great practical
mement, when it is remembered that a
vast quantity of stock passes from hand
to hand daily, without any book transfer
-a single illustration will suflice. Soon
after the Reading Railroad suspended
payments in May 1880, itwas suggested
in the newspapers, that the charter of
the company imposed an individual liability upon all the shareholders for the
debts of the corporation. Speculation
in the stock was carried on to an enormous extent, but the aetual transfers
upon the books were few. The vendees
pocketed their certificates and powers,
and awaited developments.
There is a wide divergence of opinion
upon his subject in the different States.
In Fisher v. Essex Bank, 5 Gray 381,
SiAw, C. J., said: "The clause itself
is too clear to admit of doubt, - shall be
transferable only' that is, capable of
being transferred, the largest and broadest term to express alienation on one
part, and requisition on the other and

the word ' only ' carries an implication as
strong as negative words could make it,
that it is in no other mode. It was not
to prescribe one mode, leaving others
unaffected, it made that mode exclusive."
Wiliams v. Mechanics' Bank of Neu
Haven, 5 lBlateh. 59, went further, and
declared that transferable at tee bank
means transferable only at the bank.
The Massachusetts rule seems to have
been followed in Connecticut: Dutton v.
Connecticut Banlk, 13 Conn. 493; Shipman v..Etna Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 245 ; and
-,
in Vermont: Sabln v. Bank of Woodstod
21 Vcrm. 362. In California the rule is
based on statutory regulation, and it has
been several times decided, that under
section 12 of Act of April 22d 1850, no
transfer of stock is good against third
parties, unless the transfer be made upon
the books of the company.
Wleston v.
Bear River 6- Auburn Water and M3ining
Co., 5 Cal. 186; Strout v. 1Vatows
Water and Miniyq Co., 9 Id. 78 : Aaglee v. Pacific Mharf Co., 20 Id. 529.
There is, however, a very strong current of opinion the other way. In Pennsylvania as early as United States v.
Vaughan, 3 Binney 394, it was held,
that stock assigned bona fide for full
value on the certificate, and handed over
to the vendee with a power to transfer,
conveyed such an interest that the stoek
was not liable afterwards to attachment
as the property of the vendor, although
the transfer was not made upon the books
of the bank at the time of the attachment.
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To the same effect is Commonwealth v.
Walmough, 6 Wharton 138. These were
both cases of sales of stcck, where the
vendee had neglected to have a book
transfer made.
Fnney's Appeal, 9 P. F. Smith 398
was the case of a pledge, and the same
rule prevailed.
These decisions were all in cases where
the contest lay between creditors. In
Union Bank v. Laird, 2 Wheaton 390,
it was laid down that no person could
acquire a legal title to stock, except
under a regular transfer, according to
the rules of the corporation, and if any
person takes an equitable assignment it
must be subject to the rights of the
corporation, under the acts of incorporation, of which be is bound to take
notice. To the same effect is Bank of
Commerce's Appeal, 23 P. F. Smith 59,
which was a peculiar case. The members of a building association were entitled to a loan on each share; one member pledged his certificate of stock to the
Bank of Commerce, as collateral for a
loan, with power of attorney to transfer.
He then borrowed from the building
association the full ,amount, to which he
was entitled, and transferred his stock,
the bank still holding the certificate.
The stock was not transferred to the
bank on the books of the association.
The association expired and the. assets
were distributed among the stockholders,
as shown by their books, including the
association, without notice from the bank.
A contest between the association and
the bank was decided in favor of the
former, AGNmE, J., remarking that "the
assignment of the certificate is only an
equitable transfer of the stock, and to be
made available must be produced to the
corporation, and a transfer demandedas between adverse claimants of the
certificate, the possession of it with the
transfer on it, is often the test of the
title, but when the corporation itself is
not dealing with its stockholders on the
security of his stock, and is merely per-

forming a corporate duty, its own record
is all it needs to consult, for whoever
would demand the privileges of a stockholder, should produce the evidence of
his title and ask to be permitted to participate."
The New York law, as laid down in
the familiar New Haven Railroad cases,
34 N. Y. 30, seems to be, that the
purchaser who receives a certificate with
power of attorney, gets the entire title
legal and equitable, as between himself
and the seller, with all the rights the latter possessed, but as between himself and
the corporation, he acquires only an
equitable title which they are bound to
recognise and permit to be ripened into
a legal title, when he presents himself
(before any effective transfer has been
made on the books), to do the acts required by the charter or by-laws, in
order to make a transfer. Until those
acts are done, he is not a stockhelder and
has no claim to act as such, but possesses
as between himself and the corporation,
by virtue of the certificate and power,
the right to make himself or whomsoever
he chooses, a stoc tholder by the prescribed transfer.
The contention thereof, that until a
book transfer has taken place, the holder
of the stock has but an equitable title,
is both true and untrue. It is tru§ as
against the company itself. If its rules
for example prescribe that no transfer
shall be allowed if the transferor be indebted to the company, then the title
of the transferee, legal as against the
rest of the world, is but equitable as
against the company. But it is untrue
as to all other parties. New York J- N.
H'. B. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 80;
Bank v. Kortright, 22 Wendell 348;
Rogers v. Stevens, 4 Halst. Ch.-167;"
Broadway Bank v. McElrath 2 Beasley
24; unterdon v. Nassau Bank, 2 c. r.
Green 496; Railroad Co. v. Thomason,
40 Go. 411.
It is thus observed, that the decisions
in the different states present a diversity
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of opinion, upon the question in hand.
]But it would seem that those of Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey,
rest upon a more substantial foundati6n,
and for these reasons : the argument in
favor of a hook transfer being the only
valid one as against third parties, and
more especially creditors, has been that
tile same rule which is requisite to make
a transfer of ordinary goods and chattels
valid against execution creditors, ought
to be observed and applied as far as
practicable in tile transfer of stock; that
to render a transfer of goods valid
against the claims of creditors of the
vendor, a transmutation of possession
must accompany the transfer, but as this
is not altogether practicable in the case
of stock, on account of its not being
susceptible of manual occupation, yet if
it will admit of anything being done
which can fairly be considered equivalent to an actual change in possession of
goods, it ought to be done, otherwise the
sale ought to be held invalid-, at least as
against creditors of the vendor; that a
book transfer would seem to be the only
thing that could be deemed in such a
case an equivalent to the vendee's taking
actual possession in the case of goods,
and therefore unless done the transfer
ought not to avail against creditors.
This was substantially the argument
brought forward in Coninionwealth v.
Watmough, supra, but it was well met
by Mr. Justice KEXNnDv, who said that
although the legislature had made such
stock subject to execution, yet the nature
of it has not been thereby changed, so as
to have become similar to goods and
chattels.
For the debts of the real
owners it is made liable to be taken in
execution ; but as to what constitutes the
ownership in it, or the nature of the
evidence by which it may be established,
are in no wise changed. Stock is from
its very nature incapable of such possession as to make it known or notorious
who has the use or benefit of it ; even its
existence may be known but to comparatively a few persons.
VoL. XXX.-9

The only evidence of it that can be
safely trusted as to this, is the books of
the corporation, but they being of a
private nature are not open to public
inspection. Hence it is that the ownership, though held by the owner in his
own name on the books, "is not supposed
to have given him a general credit with
the world.' The great object of requiring transfers to be made in this manner
is to prevent all difficulty that otherwise
might arise with the authorities of the
corporation, to know who its corporators
are, who are entitled to vote at elections,
receive dividends," &c.
But a second and by far the most
important question remains to be considered, viz., the position of the subpledgee in the principal case, the
pledgee without notice, of a non-negotiable security. It is horn-book law
that the assignee of a non-negotiable
security takes the same subject to all the
equities existing against the assignor.
At common law a pawnee might sell,
assign or pledge his interest in the pawn.
But should the pawnee undertake to
pledge the property, not being negotiable
securities, for a debt beyond his own, he
would be guilty of a breach of trust,
and would acquire no title beyond that
held by the pawnee: Story on Bailments, sec. 324.
This statement is
rested by Story upon a Massachusetts
case, and some very early English cases.
The former, however, hardly seems
authority for such a conclusion, because
it was decided solely upon the ground
that certain pledged securities were nego.
tiable, which, of course, altered the whole
question, while the latter has been said,
"rather to justify the liberty to repledge
on the inference drawn by and stated in
the reporter's marginal note, than to lay
it down as a proposition already established by authority :" Tyler on Usury
567. The question was finally settled in
England by the two recent cases of
Donald v. Suckling, Law Rep., I Q. B.
585, and Balliday v. Holgate, Id., 3
Excb. 299. In Pennsylvania, as early
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as Thompson v. Patrick, 4 Watts 414,

the right of the pledgee to re-pledge to
the extent of his interest was established,
but in 1878, an act was passed by the
legislature of that state (purd. 2107) prohibiting under penalty of heavy fine and
imprisonment, the repledging of any
stock, bonds or other securities, without
the consent of the pledgor. This statute
was hastily drawn and carelessly expressed. It aimed to cure an evil, and
ended by making the remedy worse than
the disease. It was violated, and necessarily violated, every day in a thousand
cases, and rendered any broker liable to
a heavy fine and several years in the
penitentiary, at the instance of any
spiteful orvindictive customer, for doing
what had long been recogrnised as perfectly valid by the common law of
Pennsylvania. Accordingly, at the last
session of the legislature, the following
proviso was added, viz., "That this act
shall not be construed to p'-event brokers
from pledging or hypothecating stock or
other securities, which tfny have purchased, in whole or in part, with their
own money or credit for others, and for
which they have not been wholly reimbursed by the parties for whom such
stocks or other securities have been pur'
chased:
Act June 10th 1881, Pamph.
L. 107.
The contention in the principal case
does not; as will be observed, arise as to
the legality of the sub-pledge, but from
the claim of the sub-pledgee to the
ownership purged from all equities existing against his assignor. The leading
Noew York case of M3cIN'eil v. Tenth
National Bank is a good illustration of
the question in hand. Plaintiff kept an
account with a firm of sto.k brokers in
N'ew York, relating to certain stocks
which they had purchased and were
carrying for him. For the purpose of
securing any balance that might become
due them, the plaintiff delivered to them
a certificate for a number of shares in
tl -tock of the St. Johrsville Bank,

,with the usual blank assignment and
power. The stock btokers pledged this
to another firm, who in turn pledged it
to the defendant. All this was without
plaintiff's knowledge. He was indebted

to them on the account for which the
shares were pledged to them in a very
small amount, but no account bad been
rendered nor any demand made. The
court held the defendants entitled to
hold the stock. In a recent Pennsylvania case the court went a step further.
One of four executors put into a broker's
hands stock of his decedent's estate,
with a bill of sale and power annexed,
signed "A. B., Acting Executor," as
collateral security for a personal indebtedness ; the broker, who knew of the
fraud, pledged the stock to defendant,
who advanced *money to him thereon in
good faith. The defendant's title was
pronounced unimpeachable: l1ood v.
Smith, 37 Leg. Int. 315, Mt. Holly
Turnpike Co. v. Ferree, 2 C. E. Green
117" Prall v. Tilt, 28 \. J. Eq. 479
M1oore v. -Atrop. Not. Bank, 55 N. Y.
46 ; Penna. Railroad Co.'s Appeal, 5 W.
N. C. 22; Wallace v. Boyd, 10 Id. 256.
It may be asked then, are not certificates of stock negotiable?
By no
means. An examination of the cases
will show that the decisions rest solely
upon the ground of estoppel. There
can be no doubt that simply intrusting
to another possession of a chattel will
not protect a purchaser from the bailee,
howQver bona fide. As was said by Mr.
Justice WOODWAnD in Quinn v. Davis,
28 P. F. Smith 18, 'The owner of a
chattel cannot, apart from legal process,
be divested of his title to it, except as a
consequence of some unlawful or improvident act of his own. The transfer
of possession to another without more is
not such an act."
"But," as was said in .3cieil v.
Tenth National Bank, supra, "if the
owner intrusts to another not merely the
possession of the property, but also the
written evidence over his own signature

